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WHAT'S IN A NAME? REFLECTIONS ON TIMING, NAMING,
AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING
VICKI C. JACKSON*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOXES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING
There is a paradox, well described by Jon Elster,' that the crisis
conditions that often lead to constitution-making are incompatible
with the kind of deliberation thought necessary for the creation of
a constitution consistent enough with the needs of its polity to be
successful. "Post-conflict" situations are likely to involve crises that
motivate constitution-making, but are also likely to create condi-
tions in which the probability of creating a lasting constitution at
one blow is low.
This essay explores the consequences of this observation,
suggesting that those committed to constitutionalism need an ex-
panded repertoire of approaches in post-conflict societies (including
contingent, incrementalist, revisable or interim approaches).
Moving directly to traditional, comprehensive forms of constitution-
making' in some circumstances may be antithetical to promoting
* Vicki C. Jackson, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. With thanks to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mark Tushnet, and, as
always, Bob Taylor, for their very helpful comments on prior drafts. I also want to thank the
other participants in the William & Mary Symposium on Constitution Drafting in Post-
conflict States, from whom I learned so much, and acknowledge the cheerful and able help
of my Research Assistants, Andrew Eberle and Eric Cochran. This essay is an edited version
of the paper I presented at William & Mary in February 2007, and based on research to that
point.
1. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-making Process, 45 DUKE L.J.
364, 394 (1995).
2. By "traditional" I refer to the preparation in a continuous, short-term process of a
purportedly comprehensive written constitution as a single (or consolidated) instrument, as
in the drafting and adoption of the U.S. Constitution. As will be developed below, the
understanding of this as a form of constitution-making distinct from more transitional
approaches is subject to challenge.
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the conditions necessary for constitutionalism-including trust in
legal institutions.3 The increasing range and diversity of consti-
tution-making approaches is humbling, or should be, especially for
those seeking to influence other countries' decisions of when and
how to engage in constitution-making. Constitutions are a founda-
tion for the rule of law, insofar as they specify the rules by which
law is made, interpreted, applied, enforced, and changed; successful
polities need a constitution (written or not) to allocate these
responsibilities. Yet making a written constitution may at times be
antithetical to the constitutionalism it seeks to promote. And calling
the process "constitutional" may at times be antithetical to
producing the kind of agreement that may lead to a more perma-
nent, or legitimate, state of constitutionalism.
A second and related paradox of relevance to constitution-making
in post-conflict societies arises from the distinctive features of
constitutions. In most settings, constitutions are understood to be
legal instruments that are foundational in terms of defining and
allocating legitimate governmental authority, hierarchically su-
preme over other sources of law,4 and entrenched-meaning that
they are more difficult to change than other forms of law and
intended to be more enduring. In the kinds of crises generated by
conflicts and their aftermaths, the entrenched, foundational, and
supreme character of the constitution as a matter of legal hierarchy
can help to mobilize attitudes of public-spiritedness and elicit
extraordinary efforts to produce the best possible document. Bruce
Ackerman famously refers to "constitutional moments" of high
popular mobilization and enhanced deliberation, beyond the type
3. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19 (1990) (observing that
law is not useful if it is ignored or does not influence behavior, and arguing that trust in legal
institutions is related to their perceived procedural fairness and that perceptions of
procedural fairness contribute to the legitimacy of government); see also Tom R. Tyler, Public
Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 847 (1998). For a suggestion
that constitutions may reflect a healthy distrust of unchecked government power, helping
to produce a willingness to coordinate or cooperate by offering forms of protection against
untrustworthy behavior by government agents, see Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV.
495, 516-21 (2001). Although Hardin argues that "law commonly fills in where trust [in "the
strong, encapsulated interest sense'] would not be possible," id. at 519, Tyler's work suggests
that without some degree of generalized trust in the institutions of law, law cannot "fill in."
4. Cf. DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63 (1996) (emphasizing that
"[clonstitutions define the rules under which all future political games are to be played").
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characteristic of "ordinary" politics.5 Moments of dramatic regime
change, as occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, may enhance the
conditions for this version of constitution-making, as the very
rupture creates a "veil of ignorance" regarding future politics and
enhances the capacity for longer term deliberation.' The raised
stakes of constitution-making may not only move contending
parties to focus on the constitutional project, but also encourage
elites-who, having invested in the project of constitution-drafting,
may have incentives to persuade those whose assent is required to
ratify the document and then, as actors in the political system, to
try to make the constitution work.7
5. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 48-51 (1992) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION]. Popular mobilization may be tested and expressed
through special methods of bringing a constitution into existence as law, but even without
high popular mobilization, the moments in which major conflicts subside and new regimes
are to be constructed have the capacity to motivate elites to put energy into crafting an
agreement that sufficient numbers can accept as the foundational, supreme, and entrenched
law. Ackerman recognizes that "a constitution can also win legitimation through evolutionary
processes, in which elites build consent without the support of revolutionary mass
mobilizations," and refers to Spain as an example. Id. at 47 n.1; see also infra pp. 1257-59
(discussing constitutionalism without a single written constitutional instrument, as in the
United Kingdom and Israel).
6. JOHN RAWis, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (explaining "veil of ignorance" as
a construct in which those deciding on future rules to govern a society do not know their own
position under the system to be designed, thereby creating incentives for impartial
judgment). For a discussion of how constitution-making processes may simulate aspects of
a "veil of ignorance," see ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 64 (arguing that
constitution-making right after the moment of founding or revolutionary change avoids the
problem of politicians becoming "more accomplished in serving specific constituencies ... [and]
less interested in uniting with one another in making an overarching constitutional
statement of principle"); Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of
Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191, 228-29 (1995) (linking conditions approaching a "veil
of ignorance" to optimal timing for constitution-making and suggesting, following
Przeworski, that some form of a "veil of ignorance" may be approached when "the
[constitutional] actors do not know the balance of forces in their society"). See also JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 78-80 (1965); cf. Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 634, 667 (2000) (arguing that
having to submit proposed constitutional amendments to multiple referenda will induce more
long-term thinking by drafters).
7. See ACKERMAN, LIBERALREVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 51-53. These benefits will arise
only where it is possible to reach a constitutional agreement in which elites in the major
communities concerned have a sufficient stake and see a sufficient benefit for themselves and
their constituencies; absent that possibility, it may be that trying to create an entrenched
constitution will do more harm than good. See infra pp. 1274-78 (discussing Iraq).
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However, a constitution's entrenched character, together with its
foundational and hierarchically supreme status, may also create
disincentives to cooperative or public-spirited drafting behavior.
Existing powerful parties fearing the loss of power through an
entrenched constitution may, rationally, be obstructive; they may
refuse to participate, block thoughtful compromises, or otherwise
seek to derail the project.8 In societies with existing cleavages based
on ascriptive identity with a clear majority in one group, minority
groups may be reluctant, even in moments of regime change, to
bargain over a document that is likely to entrench majority power;
where the rule of law is weak or legal institutions unsettled,
minorities may not be willing to rely on a legal instrument's
statement of rights. Minority groups may be especially reluctant in
fluid situations in which they believe that waiting until later will
allow them greater influence-for example, due to immigration
patterns, birth rates or other demographic trends, or to the possible
(hoped for) intervention of other external powers. The stakes of
constitution-making are high, then, and can work to enhance
constitution-making efforts, to destroy them, or to invite stalemate.
To these paradoxes, avowedly "transitional" constitutions may
seem to offer important solutions. Transitional constitutional
documents (as the Northern Ireland agreements have been de-
scribed and as the Interim South African Constitution was pro-
claimed), or more incremental constitutional processes (as in Poland
or Hungary), may decide only some, not all, of the matters that full-
8. On the possibility of rational resistance to negotiation, see Robert H. Mnookin, When
Not To Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialist Reflects on Appropriate Limits, 74 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1077, 1078-79 (2003). Although different processes may be successful in generating trust
among suspicious parties to a complex constitutional negotiation, see, e.g., Robert H.
Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and
Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that the decision rule
of "sufficient consensus" facilitated difficult negotiations in both Northern Ireland and South
Africa); cf. Dana Lansky, Proceeding to a Constitution: A Multi-Party Negotiation Analysis
of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 279, 281 (2000)
(emphasizing the role of a trusted intermediary, Benjamin Franklin, in the U.S.
Constitutional Convention), there may be both rational resistance by minority parties to
constitutional deals, where minority parties believe they can make a better deal in the
future, or with other (including foreign) parties, and understandable resistance promoted by
suspicion and the absence of trusted intermediaries. In short, for some participants, no deal
may appear better than any foreseeably available deal.
1252 [Vol. 49:1249
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fledged traditional constitutions typically address.9 Transitional
constitutions may be at once entrenched and impermanent; their
adoption may be via a process that lacks democratic legitimacy but
proclaims authority to make binding decisions, either briefly, or for
all future constitution-making. The stakes may be at once high, to
the extent that interim constitutions claim the authority to
prescribe the processes by which future agreements are made (or,
in the case of South Africa, to also specify principles to which future
constitution-making must adhere) and (relatively) low, insofar as
they contemplate their own supersession in the near future.
Some caveats and assumptions are in order. First, I posit that
both constitutions and constitution-making have multiple purposes,
and that these are not necessarily the same. Constitutions as legal
documents serve many functions, some of which may be in tension
with each other; likewise, constitution-making serves many
functions, not necessarily congruent with those of the constitution
itself, and potentially in tension with it. Constitutions may be
"constitutive" of their polity; they may express and symbolize
national identity; and they may serve as a symbol of national
sovereignty and membership in a community of nations. 0 But they
also either describe existing allocations of government or empower
and create organs of government to which different powers are
allocated. Importantly, at least in the western tradition, they also
limit government power and protect individual (and sometimes,
group) rights. Constitutions may also embody important compro-
mises among important parts of society--compromises that
represent agreements that are the foundation of peaceful coexis-
tence within one polity. Finally, constitution-making, though
intended to produce written constitutions, may serve other (and
9. See infra Parts II.B-C on Poland, Hungary, and South Africa; infra notes 152-57 and
accompanying text on Northern Ireland.
10. Constitutions are not necessarily constitutive of national identity, though in the
United States, the Constitution probably is. Nor are written constitutions necessarily
associated with national sovereignty; the United Kingdom is surely recognized as a sovereign
without having a written constitution. Constitutions may also serve (though, again, they
need not) as expressions of national commitments to international legal standards.
Increasingly, however, the connotation of having a "constitution" is intimately tied to the
identity of the contending groups within a polity.
2008] 1253
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1249
more immediate) purposes unrelated to-and even at war with-
constitutions functioning as fundamental law."
Second, I assume the normative value of constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism entails a sufficiently shared willingness to use
law rather than force to resolve disagreements; to limit government
power and to protect human rights through law and defined
processes; to provide a reasonable degree of predictability and
stability of law that people may rely on as they structure their lives;
and to maintain a government that is legitimate and effective
enough to maintain order, promote the public good, and control
private violence and exploitation.'2 The goal of constitution-making
should be understood, not as producing a written constitution, but
as promoting constitutionalism. 3
11. See, e.g., Elster, supra note 1, at 373-75 (discussing upstream and downstream
constraints resulting from the different interests of those who authorize a constitution-
making process and those who must approve the final product, the likelihood that they may
be in tension with each other, and the likely dominance of downstream constraints on
constitutional ratification). Constitution-drafting, especially under modern conditions of
publicity, often includes advancing the immediate political interests of constitution drafters
through symbolic politics associated with other political events. For this reason, Elster and
others recommend having some constitutional deliberations proceed in secret, where serious
bargaining and workable compromises are more likely to be found. See id. at 384, 387-88,
395.
12. I do not attempt a comprehensive definition nor engage with debates over the roles
of entrenchment, institutional structure, democracy, substantive moral norms, the rule of
law or political culture in defining constitutionalism. For a sampling of the literature, see
SARTORI GIOVANNI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 308-09 (1987) (discussing liberal
constitutionalism as a blend of the "rule-of-law" and a constrained "rule of legislators");
Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun, Introduction to POLITICAL CULTURE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 6-7 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun
eds., 1994) (emphasizing the importance of political culture); John Elster, Constitutionalism
in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 465 (1991) (describing
constitutionalism as a state of mind); Louis Henkin, John Marshall Globalized, 148 PROC.
AM. PHIL. 53, 55 (March 2004) (referring to consent of the governed, representative
government, separation of powers, and protection of individual rights as elements of
constitutionalism); Walter Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3 (Douglas
Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (emphasizing substantive as well as process criteria); Cass
Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1991) (emphasizing pre-
commitment).
13. The criteria for evaluating whether constitution-making in post-conflict societies has
advanced constitutionalism vary. A minimalist approach might require that the constitution-
making process produce a more peaceful commitment to governance by law and politics
(rather than violence) than existed before. More rigorous criteria would look to see if there
were some number of successful elections and changes in government power under the
1254
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In this essay, I focus on the processes of constitution-making,
more than on substantive design choices or provisions. 4 But even
with so narrow a focus, transitional constitution-making processes
offer the opportunity to reflect on conventional understandings of
the relationships between constitutions and constitutionalism in
several respects. First, constitutional desiderata generally include
the goal of endurance across long periods of time; transitional
constitutions need not embrace this aspiration. They thus cast
into new relief the relationship between traditional, entrenched
constitutions and constitutionalism; yet their efforts to bind future
constitutional decisions reflect a constitutional normativity, per-
haps transnational in character, not necessarily grounded in
positive decisions of particular polities.
Second, to the extent that transitional constitutions are being
used as instruments of peacemaking and as efforts to reconstitute
or transform their societies, such usages may challenge the idea of
constitutions as embodying a fixed or particular identity. They offer
the possibility of a new genre of constitution-like instruments
whose goal is not to entrench but to disentrench and to provide
ongoing opportunities for "unsettlement" of power relations. 5
constitution. A still more stringent set of criteria would consider the duration of the
constitution and its success not only in promoting effective governance and maintenance of
an acceptable level of order, but also in accomplishing human rights protection. (Still more
ambitious definitions could be envisioned.) Constitution-making in times of conflict or
following regime change has an uneven record of success on any of these criteria. Finally, one
must recognize the possibility that constitutions (and their making) may obstruct
constitutionalism. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 267-68 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing possible examples from Latin America, Ethiopia, and
the United States); see also infra note 92.
14. Thus, I do not consider in this essay the relationship of choices between
parliamentary and presidential forms, among various voting schemes, or between
consociational and federal approaches, to a constitution's success. (For an introduction to a
large and interesting literature on these and other aspects of constitutional design, see the
essays in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002)). Nor do I say much about the
relationships between the processes used in constitution-making and the institutional forms
adopted. See, e.g., Elster, supra note 1, at 380-82 (exploring how the "institutional interest"
of existing legislatures, for example, influences structural design (e.g., the tendency for
bicameral drafting bodies to reproduce bicameralism in the constitution)). Severing process
from substance is both artificial and impossible, as they are highly interwoven and process
choices reflect substantive commitments. Nonetheless, limitations of space narrow the scope
of this essay.
15. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF
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Indeed, transitional constitutions problematize the very name of
the instrument. Constitutions have historically been multi-purpose
instruments, in part concerned with the need to provide for the
basic rules of governance (including the selection of members of the
government and its decision-making processes) on an ongoing basis,
in part a link between past and future, in part an assertion of
particular identities, and in part a proclamation of a state's status
in the world. Resistance to naming an instrument as a "constitu-
tion" reflects the complex interaction of these elements in the minds
of the participants to constitution-like processes.
Third, dominant U.S. conceptions of a constitution see it as the
product of a discrete founding moment, created through a process
distinct from ordinary lawmaking but steeped in popular decision
making;16 transitional constitutions suggest there is more varia-
tion in the timing and processes that give rise to permanent
constitutions. Fourth, constitutions are often viewed as the product
of a particular polity, having purposes internal to that polity.
Transitional constitutions, in contrast, may include transnational
elements in governance, are often clearly shaped by external
participants, and may require further external participants as
guarantors to effectuate the transition. In this respect, transitional
constitutions offer challenges to the dominant conception of a
constitution as a purely internal legal instrument.
I discuss these points below, by reference to successful
constitution-making in Germany and Japan in the 1940s, in
Eastern Europe and South Africa after 1989, and the very challeng-
ing conditions of constitution-making in Iraq in recent years. In
Part II, I lay out three models of post-conflict constitution-making
that have arguably been successful in the post-World War II period.
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 56-58 (2001). Professor Ruti Teitel discusses the
idea of constitutions as disentrenchment devices, but in the context of transition from
authoritarian rule. See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 198 (2000).
16. Given the general exclusion of slaves and women from the relatively small group that
framed and voted on the ratification of the original U.S. Constitution and the major Civil
War Amendments, this narrative, associating the Constitution with popular will manifest
in discrete "constitutional moments" of "higher lawmaking," see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1990-2006 (2004), has significant elements of mythology, and may
obscure other equally important sources of the Constitution's endurance and legitimacy.
1256 [Vol. 49:1249
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In Part III, I examine the constitution-making process in Iraq
through late 2006 in light of these models and then analyze several
features of so-called transitional constitution-making, exploring
how it is and is not distinct and what it suggests about the chang-
ing nature of constitution-making and constitutions themselves.
II. MODES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING AFTER SERIOUS REGIME
CHANGE
Given the double-edged nature of calling on contending parties to
engage in an overtly "constitutional" lawmaking process, traditional
constitution-making should perhaps not always be understood as an
integral part of regime change or transition. Although law, and the
development of rule of law attitudes, seem like integral parts of
post-conflict transition to any kind of good, complex society, written
capital "C" constitutions are perhaps a different matter. Experience
tells us that constitutions are helpful, but perhaps not essential to
well-functioning legal systems or to the status of sovereigns in the
world. The United Kingdom has managed to get along with a
reasonably well-functioning internal rule of law system, while also
obtaining recognition on the world stage as an empowered sover-
eign, without a single written instrument that is the constitution.
Israel is another example of a country that has achieved, domesti-
cally, a considerable degree of rule of law with respect to the
population within the older boundaries of the state and has received
recognition as a sovereign in the community of nations, again,
without the adoption of a single written constitutional instrument.
On Gary Jacobsohn's account, the Israeli experience might be
understood to stand for the proposition that when a polity is deeply
divided about its own essential character, formal constitution-
making is best deferred. 7 Although Israel's Declaration of Inde-
pendence announced its intent to have a constituent assembly make
a constitution (pursuant to the United Nations 1947 partition
resolution), the constituent assembly that was elected decided
instead to function as a legislature (Knesset), providing for
17. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND
THE UNITED STATES 102-03 (1993).
2008] 1257
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transition laws; rather than adopting a complete constitution, the
Knesset would enact "Basic Laws," through ordinary lawmaking,
over time. Referred to as the Harari Resolution, this solution was
viewed as a compromise among those who wanted a constitution,
those who were opposed to limits on parliamentary sovereignty,
those who thought Israel did not need a written constitution but
could govern itself through Jewish law, and those who argued that
the timing was not right to make a constitution because "[o]ne does
not create a constitution at the beginning of a revolution but when
it is completed."'" Jacobsohn argues that "the radically different
understandings of the essence of the regime held by ... alliance
partners" made them particularly opposed to the argument, made
by proponents of a constitution, that having a constitution would
help educate a "diverse population in the political principles of the
regime."' 9 Jacobsohn suggests that the absence of agreement on
whether the essence of Israel was as a Jewish state or a secular
democratic state helps account for the deferred or incremental
character of constitution-making in Israel. The Harari Resolution
compromise might be understood to suggest the possibility of
deferring hard decisions about identity while still establishing basic
rules for the process of governance.
At the same time, some scholars argue that it is one of the first
tasks after regime change, especially from authoritarian to more
liberal, democratic regimes, to codify and entrench the basic
commitments of the new regime in a written constitution. Bruce
Ackerman has argued that it is at the moment of regime change
that there is likely to be the greatest solidarity among different
members of the prevailing movements, based on what they are
opposed to, that can be drawn on to codify fundamental commit-
ments in written form.2 ° It is a time, perhaps, of greater altruism,
which should be capitalized on-a moment above the self-interested
wheels of daily political life (in part because a new daily political
18. Id. at 101 (quoting a member of the governing party in the first Knesset and citing
to ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DOCUMENTS AND READINGS ON SOCIETY, POLITICS AND
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1948-PRESENT 42 (Itamar Rabinovich & Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. Id. at 102.
20. See AcKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 48-49.
1258 [Vol. 49:1249
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life has not yet been established and the revolutionaries are not yet
comfortable incumbents in permanent office) that offers the hope
for agreement on fundamentals of self-governance that would
enable a country to maximize its chances of sustaining the momen-
tum toward a more liberal and democratic polity.21
What one thinks about optimal timing and methods of
constitution-making may depend on what cases are seen as para-
digmatic. The examples discussed above described the incremental
development of British constitutionalism, over centuries of struggle;
the founding of the state of Israel in the wake of the Holocaust,
which created a unity of purpose among the Israeli "founders" that
overrode deeper conflicts of vision and allowed for deferral and
incrementalizing of an internal constitutional framework; or, for
Ackerman, constitution-making after something like the American
Revolution, led from within by revolutionaries who had worked and
fought together in opposition to a colonial force, now defeated and
withdrawn, for many years. None of these situations are necessar-
ily analogous to the "post-conflict societies" in which today's
constitution-making problems arise.
Other models of successful constitutional regime transition
exist: Germany and Japan, which adopted new post-World War II
constitutions under the strong influence of an occupying power
whose leadership played a significant role in the creation of a new
constitution; Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union,
using Poland and Hungary as different versions of an emerging
paradigm of incremental constitutional change; or South Africa. Yet
even after considering these examples below, no a priori answers
emerge to the questions of whether and when to adopt a new
constitution following resolution of a major conflict and the
resulting regime change.22
21. See id. at 49-52, 55-56, 64-65. While the "winners" may be at the height of altruism,
the passions and interests of the losers may nonetheless obstruct success. See JACKSON &
TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 355 (suggesting that "clean break"constitution-making may meet
sharp resistance from those formerly in power).
22. The interactions of historic, political, legal, religious, and cultural factors confound
broad generalizations. Cf. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869,
879-80 (1988) (reviewing literature showing great variation in consequences of"imposed law"
on different societies).
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Constitutions are written under a wide range of circumstances.
Three broad schematics or models of constitution-making in post-
conflict settings in the period since World War II are sketched
below, in brief, simplified terms.2" First, there are constitutional
processes designed to produce a "quick clean break" from a prior,
discredited regime in which comprehensive constitutions are
adopted wholesale in a relatively brief period of time. Some of these
are Ackermanian "constitutional moments," in which victorious
internal revolutionary forces consolidate their principles into a
constitutional document. In Germany and Japan, however, consti-
tutions were adopted by an occupied population following a
complete military victory upon the occupying power's insistence on
implementing a new constitutional regime.
Second, there are constitutions that, while representing a break
from the past, emerge from a more incremental process of constitu-
tional change, occurring not over a relatively short one- or two-year
period, but over a period that may be closer to a decade.24 In these
more incremental constitutional processes, as in Hungary or
Poland, a combination of mechanisms, including parliamentary
and civil society deliberation, parliamentary lawmaking, popular
referenda, and constitutional court decisions may be at work.
Third, and a relatively recent innovation: there are constitutions
that proclaim themselves to be transitional or interim in character,
intended to introduce some subsequent constitution-making pro-
cess. In these processes, as in South Africa, there are designedly
two (or more) stages of legitimate constitution-making, the first of
which may depend more on negotiation between elite key players,
and the latter on a more popular, participatory, and inclusive form
of deliberation and decision-making.
23. For a more comprehensive typology of the circumstances of constitution-making,
including those that do not follow major conflict (as, for example, in Canada's adopting the
1982 Charter), see RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURIsTOcRAcY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 7-8 (2004).
24. If Israel were considered a "post-conflict society," it might be argued that it is still in
transition almost sixty years after its founding, as Basic Laws covering different subjects
continue to be enacted by the Knesset in its constituent-assembly capacity.
1260 [Vol. 49:1249
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I comment briefly below on each of these models in their more
successful forms, acknowledging, however, that each model may
also have examples of failures.25
A. Quick Clean Breaks and New Permanent Constitutions Under
Occupying Forces
"Clean breaks" followed by successful constitution-making may
be more readily achieved in settings in which distant colonial
powers are divested of control, and/or in which those who formerly
held power, or were allied with those who did, can essentially leave
the country (as many Loyalists did in the United States after the
Revolutionary War). The United States Constitution, adopted after
a revolution, is sometimes viewed as a paradigm for constitution-
making as a clean break within a constitutional moment. Yet, as
others have pointed out, the 1787 Constitution was not the first, but
the second constitution under which the former colonies operated,
and the convention that produced it was informed by considerable
constitutional learning that took place under the operation of the
prior constitutional document.26 Although some of its important
25. See supra note 13 (discussing criteria for evaluating success). Failures of initial post-
colonial constitutions in Africa are sometimes attributed to the dominance of the former
colonial powers or those who had benefited from their presence in determining their
constitutions' content. See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism:
Reflections on an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 67, 70-72 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,
1993). Czechoslovakia may be an example of a failure of incremental constitution-making;
not coming relatively quickly to a new consolidated constitution arguably allowed time for
political elites in Slovakia to conclude that their interests would be better served in a
separate country. The division of this state was elite driven, and not particularly well
supported by the public in either half. See ERIC STEIN, CZECHo/SLovAKIA: ETHNIC CONFLICT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FISSURE, NEGOTIATED BREAKUP 248 (1997) (noting that in late 1992, when
the separation agreement had been negotiated, only 37 percent of Slovaks considered it
necessary); John McGarry, "Orphans of Secession': National Pluralism in Secessionist
Regions and Post-Secession States, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 220
(Margaret Moore ed., 1998) (attributing Slovak secession to "elites" and noting that in 1990
only 8 percent of Slovaks favored secession). But cf. HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 198 (2000) (treating the separation
as resulting from sharp political differences rather than national leaders' desire for
independence as such).
26. See TEITEL, supra note 15, at 206-09 (analyzing U.S. constitution-making through a
transitional perspective); see also Andrew Arato, Constitutional Learning, 52 THEORIA 1, 24
(2005). "Clean breaks" are not necessarily followed by successful "constitutional moments."
2008] 1261
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
revolutionary leadership participated in the Convention of 1787,
bringing their charisma and principled self-restraint to the table,
they did so in an atmosphere not flush with revolutionary fervor but
chastened by the challenges of governance under a more confederal
system. In any event, regime change in settings in which the
controlling powers in a prior regime are more fully integrated with
broad social groups may pose greater challenges for making a "clean
break" without continued or renewed violence, at least absent
acceptance by a large majority of the population, including members
of the former group in power.
2 7
It was clear in Iraq that the occupying forces would insist on a
"clean break" from the prior regime, one that, in all likelihood, a
great majority of the people sought as well. How to achieve this
"clean break" in the face of likely resistance from those privileged
or empowered under the prior regime, however, presented a real
challenge; here, there was a regime change effected by foreign
military intervention in a country with existing ascriptive cleavages
and little recent history of free, representative government at the
national level.
Japan and Germany are two widely cited examples of post-
conflict constitution-making,28 imposed and/or heavily supervised
by victorious occupying powers. In both of these instances, a clean
break was successfully imposed, marking a decisive abandonment
See also William W. Van Alstyne, Quintessential Elements of Meaningful Constitutions in
Post-conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1497, 1800-01 (2008).
27. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 355 ("[T]he greater the degree ofbreak'
from the past .... the greater the likely resistance of those [formerly] empowered by a regime.
Clean breaks and sharp constitutional moments may thus be more possible in settings in
which relatively segregated and small minorities are overthrown from power, or in which
colonial powers are divested of control. In both of these cases, the ability of those formerly
holding power to obstruct is limited-in one case by their isolated, minority status, in the
other by their distance."). The external connections of the internal groups are also relevant:
the oppressed group in South Africa was a substantial majority of the country whose claims
for democracy had wide international support, while the former power was a relatively small
minority, which had lost international support and whose incentives to bargain were
informed by the knowledge that they could be outvoted in any democratic polity.
28. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Redefining the War: The Administration's New Tone
Signals a Longer, Broader Iraq Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at Al ("In the prelude to
the war and in the early days of the occupation, Mr. Bush and top members of his national
security team compared the effort to remake Iraq to the American occupations of Japan and
Germany. As the insurgency grew-a feature missing from those two successful
occupations-they dropped that comparison.").
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of prior regimes that were presumably supported by significant
numbers of the population. Yet both of these cases occurred under
historically specific conditions not replicated in Iraq.
In Japan, constitution-making happened relatively quickly after
the end of World War II, in large part because of pressure brought
by General MacArthur, who advised the Japanese that in order to
prevent the prosecution of the Emperor for war crimes, adoption of
a liberal, democratic constitution that renounced rights of belliger-
ency and abolished the sacred character of the Emperor's position
was essential, and quickly, to dissuade the Allies in the Far Eastern
Commission (FEC) from seeking the Emperor's trial for war
crimes.29 The occupation forces in Japan were able to rely in
considerable measure on Japanese constitutional and legal
experts to translate and modify a draft prepared by the occupation
authorities and then negotiated, in small ways, with the existing
government of Japan.30 After elections held under full suffrage rules
took place, the legislature approved the new constitution as an
amendment to the prior Meiji Constitution. 31 During this post-
surrender period, the occupation forces faced little or no armed
resistance."
In Germany, constitution-making happened after a somewhat
longer period of occupying force governance. Representative govern-
ment was built from the bottom up in the lnder (subnational)
subdivisions in the three sectors controlled by the United States,
29. See RAYA. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE
NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 109 (2002); KOSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF
JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 100-01 (Ray A. Moore ed. and trans., 1997); see also
LAWRENCE W. BEER & JOHN M. MAKi, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH TO DEMOCRACY: JAPAN'S TWO
CONSTITUTIONS, 1889-2002, at 77-94 (2002); THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN'S
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5-11, 28-29 (2000). The FEC's position concerning the treatment
of post-war Japan, its constitution, and constitution-making procedures differed from
MacArthur's in several respects. See generally MOORE & ROBINSON, supra, at 142-54.
30. See KOSEKI, supra note 29, at 99-130; MCNELLY, supra note 29, at 7-10; MOORE &
ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 137-38 (describing negotiations over local government
provisions).
31. See generally MOORE&ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 282, 183-314; KOSEKI, supra note
29, at 91-94.
32. This was at least in part due to the Emperor's ability to command respect from the
population for his decision to surrender, see MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 48-49,
following the devastation wrecked by the use of nuclear bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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the United Kingdom, and France.3 These ldnder governments then
sent representatives to a body that, from the occupying powers'
viewpoint, was a constitution-drafting body; from the German
participants' viewpoint, however, they were drafting a "basic law,"
with ratification to be obtained not by popular referendum as the
Allies had proposed, but by votes taken in each of the ldnder
legislatures. 4 Although concern existed about the so-called "were-
wolves" (adherents to the former regime trained as guerillas), there
was in fact very little violent resistance to the Allied occupation of
Germany.35
In each case, the timing of constitution-drafting was motivated
in important part by factors external to the polity itself, involving
relationships among occupying allied powers. In each case,
wholesale constitutional revision was entailed. (Despite formalities
of constitutional continuity in Japan through its enactment as an
amendment, the Japanese Constitution and the German Basic
Laws were complete and wholesale constitutional revisions.) In
each case, an occupying power that had won a complete surrender
and faced little, if any, continued resistance to the occupation,
played a dominant role in the timing and strongly influenced the
content of constitution-making. 6 The completeness of the occupying
33. See JOHN FORD GOLAY, THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1-17
(1958); PETER H. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC 3-15, 18-19 (1963).
34. See MERKL, supra note 33, at 53-54 (describing the desire of heads of the ldnder
governments to "emphasize even more the provisional character of the new arrangement"
by avoiding the term "constituent assembly" to describe the drafting body and the term
"constitution" to describe the document, and by not having popular ratification "so as not to
give it the full weight of a constitution"); see also GOLAY, supra note 33, at 40; Inga
Markovits, Constitution-making After National Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990,
49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1307, 1308-09 (2008). Although the Allies initially insisted on
ratification by referendum, they were later persuaded otherwise. See infra notes 140-45 and
accompanying text.
35. See Michael J. Frank, U.S. Military Courts and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 645, 691 & n.171, 751 n.451 (2006); see also HAROLD ZINK, AMERICAN
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY 105 (1947) (noting that anticipation of "serious
difficulty" due to "underground movements, youthful gangsters and general hatred" was not
realized in early months of the occupation); id. at 122 (noting crimes by displaced persons as
a problem in the winter of 1945).
36. Another factor is the homogeneity of the people. See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note
29, at 16 (describing Japan as ethnically homogenous). Although there were political and
ideological disagreements among those involved in constitution-drafting in Japan and
Germany, ascriptive differences (e.g., of religion, language, or ethnicity), which can all too
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forces' victory over a regime that had had significant popular
support laid a foundation in each country for a commitment to
wholesale constitutional change, recognized by virtue of the
country's defeat as a necessity that could not be avoided, and
created incentives for cooperation that were important in the
process. So within the broad model of "clean break" constitution-
making, there are important variations, involving, inter alia, the
roles of internal political groups and external forces, consisting of
former, or present, occupying or colonial powers.
B. Incremental, Multi-channel Constitutional Regime Change
In Eastern Europe, constitution-making occurred in a different
kind of "post-conflict" setting, one in which political conflict had
been previously suppressed by Communist Party hegemony. With
the withdrawal of Soviet support for Communist governments in
Eastern Europe and the fall of several of those governments in open
elections, a more incremental method of constitutional regime
change occurred, albeit with marked differences from one country
to another. 7 Formal changes in the constitution began immedi-
ately-and marked a very clear break from the prior regime-but
constitutional change continued to emerge over a longer time period
as well, in a process in which domestic courts and informal
negotiations played important roles.
In Poland, the seeds of constitutional change began before 1989,
with the establishment of a Constitutional Tribunal in the mid-
1980s."8 For eight years, beginning in 1989, an incremental process
of constitutional revision occurred that included amendments
adopted in 1989 and the adoption of the so-called "Small Constitu-
readily become quite polarizing, may have had less political salience. (My knowledge,
however, is limited, and societies that may appear homogenous to outsiders with limited
knowledge may be less so below the surface.)
37. This brief account necessarily glosses over the very different histories of Poland,
Hungary, and other former "eastern bloc" countries that would be needed to fill in this story.
38. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 49 (describing how Poland's Constitutional Court
was authorized in 1982, established in 1985, and functioned from 1986 until 1997, when it
was replaced by a larger Constitutional Tribunal under the 1997 constitution). Beginning in
1989, when new members joined the court, it became more active in reviewing legislation.
See id. at 56.
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tion" of 1992, both of which preceded negotiation, drafting, and
adoption of the final constitution in 1997.39 In Hungary, which had
also seen a process of constitutional liberalization begin in the
1980s, if not earlier, constitutional change occurred in 1989
primarily through extensive "round table" discussions within and
among the Communists and Socialists, their opposition, and civil
society groups.4 ° The round table discussions produced agreements
for piecemeal amendments to the existing constitution, enacted by
the sitting parliament, which also created early on an empowered
Constitutional Court.4 '
Both Poland and Hungary proceeded in their constitution-making
without external occupation-in a sense, liberated from the realistic
possibility of external occupation by the former Soviet Union. Their
incrementalist processes relied on a mix of informal negotiations,
legislative action, judicial interpretation,42 and, in the case of
Poland, a popular referendum.4 3
What made these more incremental approaches occur, and what
made it possible to pursue them without significant bloodshed or
governmental breakdown, is of clear importance to generalizing
from this model." One might have thought that traditional
39. See generally MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND
(1998). The "Small Constitution," Brzezinski explains, was in important part a reaction to
an immediate crisis over the distribution of legislative and executive power; it did not
address constitutional rights and was understood to be provisional. See id. at 97-99, 106.
40. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court
Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1757, 1774-75 & n.43 (2006) (indicating that the one hundred amendments to the old
constitution changed almost 90 percent of its text).
41. See Istvan Pogany, Constitutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary's
Transition to Democracy, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 332, 338 (1993).
42. On the important and constructive role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and
its president, Laszlo Solyom, in the transition, see Scheppele, supra note 40, at 1775-91; see
also SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 75-82, 106-08 (describing the court in the period up through
1998 as "one of the most valuable institutions in Hungary's progress toward constitutional
democracy").
43. See Ryszard Cholewinski, The Protection of Human Rights in the New Polish
Constitution, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236, 236 & n.2 (1998); see also BRZEZINSKI, supra note
39, at 112-13, 127.
44. For a critical view of incremental processes, see Arato, supra note 26, at 6-8 (arguing
that processes without definite stages and end dates for constitution-drafting risk
"degenerat[ion] into the kind of permanent constitutional revolution that is unable to found
any system of authority" and, relatedly, "privilege learning over normativity" too much).
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constitution-making would have a high priority and that agreement
would be reached on a single document relatively easily, given the
early stages of transition and ideological preparation that had
occurred before the dramatic events of 1989 (costing the Communist
Party external support for its continued hegemony) and the
powerful incentive to cooperate offered by the prospect of joining the
European Union. Instead, constitutional change proceeded in a
more piecemeal fashion, guided by round table discussions whose
conclusions were acted upon by legislative bodies in formal
compliance with the amendment process of prior constitutions. In
both, large portions of the population had in some sense cooperated
with the Communist Party when it was in power and members of
the former regime for the most part remained in their respective
countries. There was no crushing military victory, no occupying or
dominant and well-organized power to insist on speedy action on a
single, integrated new constitution. The longer period (especially in
Poland) and the more incremental approach not only allowed, but
may have resulted from, the need for extended negotiations and
practice in democratic bargaining among the adherents to the prior
regime and other groups now able to exercise political freedoms.45
C. Interim Constitutions in Planned Stages
A third model, which may overlap with each of the other two, is
exemplified by South Africa, where a significant regime change
occurred without external armed intervention (but following years
of international pressure). South Africa's constitution-making
process was internally driven (though with considerable "outside"
input); it involved a wholesale constitutional change that was more
deliberately staged than in the Eastern European models and that
occurred over a longer period of time than the "quick clean break"
constitution-making in Germany or Japan. It saw multiple phases,
which began no later than in 1990 with the release of Nelson
45. Cf. JON ELSTER, CLAUSE OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-
COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA 64 (1998) (suggesting that at times
"non-constitution making may be the wiser choice," as in Poland, where postponing
enactment of a whole new constitution permitted deferral of difficult church-state issues,
including abortion).
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Mandela from prison and culminated in 1996 after the South
African Constitutional Court approved a revised, final consti-
tution.46
The successful constitutional process itself involved early and
sustained negotiation of basic principles that marked a clear break
from the prior regime; an Interim Constitution embodying those
principles that created a powerful Constitutional Court to approve
the final constitution; constitution-drafting by a democratically
elected national legislature with substantial public input and
outreach, including transitional provisions that provided security
to members of the prior regime for a few years thereafter; a further
legislation-drafting process in response to revisions that the
Constitutional Court said were necessary; and the unexercised
possibility of public referendum.4"
The first phase of formal negotiations, whose ground rules took
considerable time to establish, was the Multi-party Negotiating
Process, which lasted roughly two years-from 1992 to 1994.48 This
process led to an agreement on an interim constitution in late 1993,
which was enacted into law in January 1994 and came into full
force in April 1994 when democratic elections with full adult
suffrage for a new legislature occurred pursuant to the interim
constitution. 49 The Interim Constitution was a substantial gover-
nance instrument and included over 250 articles dealing with
executive, legislative, and judicial power, as well as local, provin-
46. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALIZATION AND SOUTH
AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 73-92, 95-105, 110-17 (2000) [hereinafter KLUG,
CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY]; see also Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and
Legal Status, 100 AM. J. IN'L L. 373, 376 (2006) (noting the importance of the 1989 Harare
Declaration for developing a framework for negotiations between Mandela and de Klerk).
47. See KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 104-05 (describing
transitional power-sharing agreement with members of old regime); JACKSON & TUSHNET,
supra note 13, at 280-85 (describing the Interim Constitution and subsequent processes
culminating in adoption of the final constitution).
48. This multi-party negotiating group came out of the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (CODESA), which met at the end of 1991. For a description of its work, see
LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSITIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS 4-6 (1994); see also PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE 194-95 (1997)
(describing Nelson Mandela's proposal for the two-stage process made about a year before
the CODESA first met).
49. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA
744 (CC) 1 10-17 (S. Afr.).
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cial, and national authority. It provided, inter alia, for the estab-
lishment of a Constitutional Court and set forth basic rights to be
enforced by that court. It not only specified the procedures to be
followed for adopting a constitution, but it also specified thirty-four
basic principles with which the new constitution would need to
comply-a provision to be enforced by Constitutional Court
review.5 °
Following the 1994 election of a democratic legislature, which
also worked as a constituent assembly, the constitution was drafted
over the next two years in a process that included a stunning
amount of outreach. This outreach included the extensive circula-
tion of drafts and explanatory materials that led to more than 70
percent of the public having knowledge of the constitutional
process." The constitution, as passed by the legislature, was
submitted to the Constitutional Court, which provided opportuni-
ties for and received much public comment. The Court found that
in certain respects the constitution did not comply with the thirty-
four principles. The legislature acquiesced to the binding force of
these principles (or the Court's interpretation thereof) by redrafting
in response to the Court's objections and producing in a relatively
quick period of time (about a month) a revised version, soon there-
after approved by the Court.52
The enormous potential for violence in the South African
transition was for the most part, though not entirely, averted.53 The
combination of international condemnation of the apartheid regime,
the African National Congress's (ANC's) preparatory work that
50. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 sched. 4 (basic principles).
51. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 283 n.f.
52. See id. at 284-85.
53. In the early years of transition there were violent encounters; mass strikes also
played a role in forcing reluctant leaders of apartheid regime-established "homelands" to
participate in the process. See DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 48, at 2-3, 7, 11-12; Heinz
Klug, Constitution-making, Democracy and the "Civilizing"of Unreconcilable Conflict: What
Might We Learn from the South African Miracle? 3-8 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Stud. Research
Paper No. 1046, 2007) [hereinafter Klug, South African Miracle], available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractLid=987302. The potential for organized--or disorganized-
violence was present throughout much of the early negotiating process, and was no doubt a
factor in the decision making that sought to avert it. See KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY,
supra note 46, at 103 (discussing how the "gunning down of ANC protesters" in 1992
"emphasized the ANC's inability either to seize power through insurrection or to insist upon
an unfettered constituent assembly').
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helped influence the international community's views, the cre-
ative use of interim institutions (including establishment of the
Constitutional Court), and the ability to agree on a small number
of basic principles that would endure were important contributing
factors to this success. Additionally, one must not ignore the
importance of the personal characteristics and self-restraint of
much of the leadership in the South African negotiations, which
also helped to create space for a constitutional transition that was
surprisingly deliberative and broadly inclusive.5 4 The constitution-
making process may be as much a symptom of the commitments,
capacities, and incentives of the leadership, both elected and
unelected, and the people, as it was a factor that contributed to the
relatively peaceful regime transition.
III. THE ROLE OF TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN POST-
CONFLICT REGIME CHANGE TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW AND
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE CHALLENGES OF
CONTEXTUALIZED ANALYSIS
The few examples discussed above might be understood to
suggest that, at least in the absence of a relatively complete
military victory and occupying force on the ground, a fair amount
of time-for deliberation, compromise, education, participation, and
renewed discussion prior to efforts to solidify agreements in a
comprehensive and final constitution-is conducive to successful
constitution-making in situations of serious post-conflict regime
change. The South African process, in particular, has encouraged
interest in the possibility that forms of structured constitutional
"reflexivity" or 'learning" can occur through adoption and imple-
mentation of a "temporally extended method of constitution making
[in] several carefully delineated steps."5 But comparison and
54. See Klug, South African Miracle, supra note 53, at 25. Desmond Tutu's appeal for
forgiveness, and the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, though not
uncontroversial, may also deserve consideration as factors that may have helped to create
and sustain space for this constitutional transition.
55. ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, AND LEGITIMACY 254-55 (2000); cf.
ULRICH K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND PROGRESS 115, 124-25 (1995) (suggesting that Round Table processes contributed to or
were examples of "reflexive constitutionalism," pointing toward a constitution "of cognitive
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generalization here are remarkably difficult, and turn out to be
something of a quagmire.
There are many confounding factors that may affect analysis and
predictions in particular cases. These include the nature of current
leadership elites; the nature of the prior regime; the nature of any
indigenous preparatory work on a new constitution; and the
presence or absence of deep cleavages in society not resolved by the
prior conflict. Social welfare inequalities, group identification and
inter-group relationships, existing legal institutions and political
culture, existing layers of law and functioning (vel non) government
infrastructures, and other broader issues of history and context are
also important, as are questions of appropriate "lustration" (and
containment of various forms of revenge), and the role of neighbor-
ing or powerful states or transnational actors. All of these factors
may interact with different processes of constitution-making,
including how drafters are elected or appointed and, if elected,
whether for a special convention or as members of a standing
legislature, as well as provisions for popular participation. Each
case study, when more fully elaborated, may involve instances of
potential failure averted, of potential opportunities lost, and many
distinguishing characteristics.
Yet one can perhaps say at least this: the apparent success of
some forms of "transitional" or incremental constitutional change
should plainly caution against assumptions that final constitution-
making is necessarily the best first step towards establishing
constitutionalism in post-conflict societies.56 Instead it appears that
democratic legitimacy can emerge through a range of processes,
and moral learning, in which society makes itself an experiment" that is open to change, and
calling for a "constitution of knowledge" to be strengthened over a "constitution of power").
In some sense, formal provisions for constitutional amendment provide a capacity for change
in light of experience; Preuss suggests the distinctiveness of "morally reflexive
constitutionalism" in transitional settings like the Round Tables consists of an institutional
capacity for "social self-enlightenment" in which the very "conditions of this discourse itself
are constitutionally reformulated," id. at 123, 125, implying that both the process and
substance of constitutional transition were the subjects of learning and renegotiation. Arato
is more skeptical. See supra note 44.
56. But cf. U.S. Inst. for Peace, Rule of Law: Project on Constitution Making,
Peacebuilding, and National Reconciliation, http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/
constitution.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (describing the "drafting of a new constitution"
as "a key element of democratization and state-building').
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including those formally controlled by less than fully legitimate
governments or by occupying military authorities from liberal
democracies.
A. Iraq: Timing and Other Choices, Internal and External Forces
In a sense, the model initially used in Iraq was a cross between
a "transitional constitution" model and a "clean break/compre-
hensive drafting" model, premised upon democratic ratification
through referendum rather than on parliamentary approval.5" Some
of the preconditions that existed in South Africa for its multi-
stage model were not present: there was no indigenous equivalent
to the ANC within Iraq that could provide a well-organized and
ideologically well-prepared source of leadership." Nor, after the
military intervention in Iraq, was there a well-functioning govern-
mental infrastructure, 59 nor a corps of delegates with substantial
57. The use of "interim" constitutions had a sorry history in Iraq, where Hussein held
power for the most part under such an "interim" instrument. See Nathan J. Brown,
Constitutionalism, Authoritarianism, and Imperialism in Iraq, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 923,928-29
(2005).
58. Although there were internal resistance movements (beginning with the Shiite al-
Da'wa organization in 1957), they were more splintered (in part because the level of
repression seriously curtailed organization, in part because of differences in religious
ideology) and mostly oriented to the establishment of some form of Islamic state; efforts by
Iraqis in exile to form an umbrella resistance organization that included religious and
secular opposition and the Kurdish minority were, according to Juan Cole, largely
unsuccessful. See Juan Cole, The Iraqi Shiites: On the History of America's Would-be Allies,
BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 2003, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR28.5/cole.html
(describing al-Da'wa's withdrawal from Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress in 1995 over
disputes with the Kurds). On the continuing impact of the history and form of the early
opposition, see, for example, Sudarson Raghavan, Maliki's Impact Blunted by Own Party's
Fears, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2007, at Al (noting that the Da'wa Party was a potent force, that
it had a cell-based structure that promoted secrecy, and that it was suspicious of the United
States, in part because of its failure to back an uprising in 1991). For another account of the
role of the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein that developed after the Gulf War, see Noah
Feldman & Roman Martinez, Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An
Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 885-90, 918-19 (2006) (arguing
that the Iraqi opposition was influential in formulating and advancing an approach to the
new constitution commited to "Islam, democracy, pluralism, federalism, and human rights").
On the importance of preparatory work or prior frameworks, see infra note 132 (noting the
ANC's 1988 framework); see also Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Local Meets Global:
Transitional Justice in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 871, 871 n.2 (2003).
59. See JONATHAN MORROW, WEAK VIABILITY: THE IRAQI FEDERAL STATE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS 4 (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Special Rep. No. 168, July
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experience in legislation or successful constitution-making. ° The
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) functioned as something of
an interim constitution, but the constitution-drafting process that
followed arguably failed to allow enough time for the major groups
to work by real consensus or for sustained public outreach and
participation prior to a vote. In contrast to the two years of the
Multi-party Negotiation Process in South Africa followed by two
years of constitution-drafting, the 2005 constituent assembly in
Iraq had only a few months and did not take advantage of an
extension period contemplated by the TAL under pressure from the
occupying authorities.6 1 In fact, just days before the referendum on
the final constitution, a provision was added-but not printed in the
drafts previously circulated for review-to provide for a further
2006) [hereinafter MORROW, WEAK VIABILITY], available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/srl68.pdf ("Regime change did not consist of replacing Saddam Hussein's
cabinet ministers with U.S. appointees; the dismantling of government ministries was near
total. Saddam Hussein's government apparatus was utterly destroyed in 2003, and the
central governmental power that existed before then reverted more or less immediately to
regional and local sectarian interests.").
60. Cf. Lansky, supra note 8, at 281-83 (noting the importance of the experience that
most of the members of the U.S. Constitutional Convention had had in working in
representative bodies at the state or national levels).
61. See JONATHAN MORROW, IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONALPROCESSII:ANOPPORTUNITYLOST
2 (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Special Rep. No. 155, Dec. 2005) [hereinafter MORROW, IRAQ'S
CONSTITUTIONALPROCESS II], available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr155.pdf.
As Morrow recounts, the TAL "envisaged a six-and-a-half month, transparent, participatory"
process and "also provided the option, in Article 61(F), of a further six-month extension." Id.
The six-month period was, under the circumstances, quite short. Although elections to the
committee were held in late January, the drafting process did not even begin until late June
or early July 2005, and in early August Kurdish and Shi'a leaders began to exclude Sunnis
(who came late into the process because of their prior boycott of elections for members of the
drafting group) from participation in drafting discussions. Notwithstanding Article 61(F) and
the "preference of the Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee" that it be used, the
U.S. government "pressed for the drafting to be completed by August 15," id. at 2, leading
to what has been described as a greatly foreshortened, nonconsensual process with wholly
inadequate time to subsequently distribute information, receive public responses, and
analyze and respond to those responses prior to the referendum held on October 15. See id.
at 8-20; cf. Daniel H. Cole, From Renaissance Poland to Poland's Renaissance, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2062, 2093 (1999) (reviewing BRZEZINKSI, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
POLAND, supra note 39, and noting that "[tihe remarkable thing is not that it took Poland
eight years to adopt a new constitution but that it took Poland only eight years to adopt a
new constitution'); ELSTER, OFFE & PREUSS, supra note 45, at 68-69 (suggesting that
Czechoslovakia's failure to survive may be attributed to adoption of a two-year period for
constitution-making, rather than either a shorter (three-month) or longer (ten-year) period).
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revision soon after its ratification (reflecting both time pressure and
potential provisionality).62
The drafting process in Iraq arguably exacerbated, not miti-
gated, group suspicion. Although it is still early for evaluation, the
interim constitutional process in Iraq lacked features of timing and
inclusiveness that some other successful uses of interim processes
had. Part of the premise underlying theoretical accounts of
transitional constitution-making is the benefit which the processes
of negotiating an instrument and working with it will have upon
groups whose suspicion of one another prevents them from drafting
a more permanent constitution. In Kug's terms, initially seeking
agreement only on broad principles enables contending groups to
imagine different applications; over the course of discussions within
a transitional framework, the contending groups become accus-
tomed to a legalized, principled form of argument, which has a
"civilizing" effect on what might otherwise produce violent con-
frontations."3 But this was not the case in Iraq, where the Sunni
62. Article 142, inserted on October 12 before the October 14 referendum, provided that
the elected legislative body should "at the beginning of its work" form a committee to make
recommendations "within a period not to exceed four months" concerning "necessary
amendments"; it also provided for voting rules both within parliament (absolute majority)
and by required popular referendum (majority vote, but defeated if rejected by two-thirds of
voters in three or more governorates). See MORROW, WEAKVIABILITY, supra note 59, at 2, 5-6.
As of mid-2006, the committee had apparently not yet been appointed. See id. at 2-10
(explaining how much change is needed for Iraq to be a viable state and describing how
difficult it would be to pass any constitutional amendments). In at least one other respect the
Iraqi Constitution had a "transitional" element, providing for a three-member Presidency
Council for the first four years, to be replaced by a single President. See Feldman &
Martinez, supra note 58, at 913-14.
63. See Klug, South African Miracle, supra note 53, at 25 (arguing that the South African
process illustrates "how the adoption of constitutional principles and a constitutionalist
discourse made available 'legitimate' rules and practices for the 'civilizing' of local
difference"); cf. Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, Constitutional Theory and the Quebec
Secession Reference, 13 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 143, 167 (2000) (suggesting that at
times, in both constitution-making and constitutional interpretation, "agreement is easier
with respect to abstract principles and harder with respect to particulars"). Yet negotiation
theory suggests that, perhaps particularly in post-conflict settings in which groups are deeply
riven, it may be easier to build trust by seeking agreement on small, incremental matters.
Robert S. Adler & Elliott M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power
Differentials in Negotiation, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 83 (2000) (suggesting that trust
develops through small, incremental steps of trust confirmed by reciprocal extensions of trust
and citing DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 1, 124-27 (1981) to similar effect); cf.
ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GE'TTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 162 (2d ed. 1991) (noting the role of negotiation over "small issues" in
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population boycotted elections for members of the drafting body,64
indicating that not all groups were ready even to discuss a final
constitution. The United States insisted upon and was able to
arrange for Sunni representatives late in the process, but after only
a few weeks of discussions, representatives from the other two
groups excluded the Sunnis from further discussions.65 The entire
process took less than six months, despite the advice of a number
of experts that more time was needed.6 Although the constitution
was approved at the referendum, the Sunni population voted over-
whelmingly against it.67 Sunni lack of participation, and exclusion,
were basic failures, though perhaps not the only ones in the
constitutional process.6
Although the history of this Iraqi constitution is still unfolding,
its prospects for success are currently in doubt.69 The difficulties
a relatively successful end to a plane hijacking crisis).
64. See MORROW, IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS II, supra note 61, at 6.
65. See id. at 8-9.
66. See infra note 70.
67. See MORROW, WEAK VIABILITY, supra note 59, at 3.
68. The ratification formula, providing a veto if three or more provinces rejected the
constitution by more than two-thirds, also raises questions (as any voting scheme may do,
see infra note 116). Although some critics saw this provision as too great a concession to the
Kurdish community, one might also wonder how a constitution that was rejected by decided
majorities in three Sunni provinces--but not by the requisite supermajority in one of these,
see MORROW, IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS II, supra note 61, at 3-would thereafter
obtain legitimacy in those areas. In an increasingly ethnically polarized state, where the very
nature and scope of the state is at issue, adopting a binding instrument so plainly opposed
by the vote of substantial numbers of a major minority group is a risky proposition, though
perhaps not without precedent in the world of constitution-making. (The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 was adopted without the consent of Quebec, see JACKSON &
TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 1041; yet Canada, despite interest in secession among some in
Quebec, continues to be a reasonably well-functioning liberal democracy.)
For other critiques of the constitution that emerged in Iraq, including its unusually
decentralized federalism with an extremely weak central government (highlighted by the fact
that regional laws have priority over most national laws), see, for example, YASH GHAI & JILL
COTTRELL, A REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ (2005), http://law.wisc.edu/ils/glsi/
arotcoi.pdf; MORROW, WEAK VIABILITY, supra note 59, at 5-6, 29-30 (criticizing federalism
provisions). For a more positive view, see John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, Iraq's
Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription, 5 IN'L J. CONST. L. 670
(2007).
69. For pessimistic assessments, see, for example, JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN &
ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? 96 (2006) (arguing that U.S. pressure for a rigid
and fast timetable in Iraq led to a constitution that did not represent consensus and "may
do more to exacerbate intergroup conflict than to ameliorate it"); Andrew Arato, Post-
Sovereign Constitution Making and Its Pathology in Iraq, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 552
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surrounding the constitution may have been exacerbated by the
absence of full Sunni participation, the United States's insistence
on the speedy production of a final constitution, an absence of
the internal infrastructure for successful "quick clean break"
constitution-drafting that existed in Japan and Germany, and the
failure to allow more time for adapting South Africa's innovative
model of interim constitution-making (including inadequate public
outreach or consideration of public comments).7 ° Little, if any,
(2006-07); see also NATHAN J. BROWN, IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS PLUNGES AHEAD 1
(Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Policy Outlook, July 2005) [hereinafter BROWN,
PROCESS PLUNGES AHEAD], available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO19
Brown.pdf (explaining "why the constitution is unlikely to address Iraq's political crisis");
UNMAKING IRAQ: A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS GONE AWRY 1 (Int'l Crisis Group, Middle East
Briefing No. 19, Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter UNMAKING IRAQ], available at http://www.
crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3703 (arguing that "[r]ushing the constitution" made
consensus impossible and resulted in a poor constitutional text). Writing in July 2006,
however, Morrow concluded that although the constitution lacked legitimacy, its existence
as a legal text might provide a framework for a revised federalized polity. See MORROW,
WEAK VIABILITY, supra note 59, at 1, 3; see also McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 68, at 676
(arguing that Iraq's future depends on defense of the 2005 Constitution and its further
development "in a liberal consociational direction").
70. For contemporaneous criticism of the proposed constitutional process in Iraq,
including the extremely limited time effectively available for constitution-drafting (on paper
a six-month period after elections to the constituent assembly; in fact only about two months,
with a referendum scheduled two months thereafter), see NATHAN J. BROWN, IRAQ'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM 1 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Aug. 31, 2005),
available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/brown8 314.pdf ('The Iraqi consti-
tutional process was asked to do too much too quickly."); BROWN, PROCESS PLUNGES AHEAD,
supra note 69, at 3 (expressing concern in July 2005 about the "rushed process" and
suggesting that the United States was insisting on meeting the August 15 deadline rather
than permitting the extension contemplated by the TAL because meeting deadlines "is the
strongest evidence available of political progress" that might respond to strong domestic
criticism of the Bush Administration); IRAQ: DON'T RUSH THE CONSTITUTION (Int'l Crisis
Group, Middle East Rep. No. 42, June 8, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?l=l&id=3506; IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONALPROCESS (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Special
Rep. No. 132, Feb. 2005), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr132.pdf
(raising concerns that the TAL did not specify sufficient processes for promoting the
legitimacy of the constitution-making it contemplated, and noting concerns over timing
because an effective public education process takes at least a year, and the period for drafting
was itself so short that "[coming up with a realistic timetable for this process will be an
immediate challenge"); UNMAKING IRAQ, supra note 69. Although deadlines may play a useful
role in bringing complex constitutional negotiations to a close, choosing the time for a
deadline is not always easy. See, e.g., GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE 126-27, 142, 144-
47 (1999) (describing years of discussions leading up to his decision on the timing of a
deadline that worked because the parties were ready for it); see also I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN,
RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 266-73 (updated ed. 1989)
(arguing that some conflicts may not be "ripe" for resolution until the parties reach a
2008] WHAT'S IN A NAME? 1277
attention was given either to more fully trying to implement a
serious, multi-staged constitutional process as occurred in South
Africa, or to adapting the approach taken in Germany after World
War II of developing representative bodies in subnational levels
before seeking to engage in a national constitution-drafting
process.7' Given the radical discontinuities in governance capacity
produced by the invasion, the overthrow of the Hussein govern-
ment, and the de-Baathification that followed, building from the
existing national legal infrastructures (as in Eastern Europe) was
not an option.
The constitution may end up being seen as a useful step towards
establishing constitutionalism in Iraq,72 but thus far an argument
can be made that the process of its adoption gave force to insurgen-
cies against the U.S.-backed government." One hopes otherwise,
but Iraq's may be a situation in which premature efforts to engage
in full-scale constitution-making were antithetical to long-term
prospects for the rule of law and constitutionalism, in part because
"mutual, hurting stalemate," which can be difficult to identify amidst "the rubble of events");
Melanie Greenberg, Mediating Massacres: When "Neutral, Low-Power"Models of Mediation
Cannot and Should Not Work, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 185, 192 (2003) (referring to
Zartman's work).
71. As of mid-2007, reorganization of some basic government services at local levels was
reportedly occurring in Iraq. See Michael E. O'Hanlon & Kenneth M. Pollack, Op-Ed., A War
We Just Might Win, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at A19 (reporting that the Iraqi National
Police, controlled by the Interior Ministry, "remains mostly a disaster," but that "[fin
response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally
prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian). Evidently, in November 2005 some
"Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)" were established to assist provincial and local
governments in their governance functions; in January 2007, new PRTs were established.
See ROBERT M. PERITO, PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ 1-2 (U.S. Inst. of Peace,
Special Rep. No. 185, Mar. 2007), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
sr185.pdf.
72. For a positive assessment of the substance of the 2005 constitution's "liberal
consociational approach" and "flexible asymmetry," see McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 68,
at 687-88.
73. MORROW, WEAK VIABILITY, supra note 59, at 3 (concluding that the constitution-
making of 2005 was a "high-water mark of the degree to which Iraq's Sunni Arabs have been
excluded, and have excluded themselves, from Iraqi public life. The result of this failure has
been violence ... [and] it remains quite possible that the way the Iraqi constitution was
drafted in 2005 contributed to the post-August shift of the Sunni Arab insurgency to attack
Shia and Kurdish civilian targets, and the corresponding arrest, summary detention and in
some cases torture and execution of Sunni Arab suspects by Shiite members of the Iraqi
public security forces.").
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they failed to allow the time for bargaining, negotiating, and
deliberation (first over ground rules, then over substance) that
might have created sufficient incentives for each of the contending
groups to have a stronger stake in the success of the constitution
and the Iraqi state. The connections between processes of consti-
tution-making and their ultimate substance and acceptance are
complex and contingent; whether a constitution "works," or ends up
being viewed as transitional or permanent, can sometimes be
determined only after the passage of much time. But at a minimum,
experience suggests the need for more analysis of the role of time,
and timing, in constitution-making and regime change.7 4
B. Transitional Constitutions: Entrenchment, Endurance, and
Identity
The timing of a constitution-making process is only one factor
among many other aspects of process, form, and substance. This
Section explores designedly transitional, incrementalist approaches,
in relation to the "clean break," comprehensive constitution-making
model. The two more transitional constitutional models noted
above---one involving incremental constitutional change following
political regime change, the other involving a multi-staged "interim"
constitutional process-are no panacea. Yet they present intriguing
alternatives to the U.S. founding paradigm, particularly in in-
tensely divided polities.
74. More time is not necessarily always better; the calculus of time for legitimate and
effective lawmaking is quite complex. Cf. Jacob E. Gerson & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules
and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543 (2007) (arguing that timing rules for
enactment of legislation may have both positive and negative effects; for example, "delay"
rules may allow time for polarized debates to moderate, but may also allow time for more
interest group influence). For recent scholarly work linking time and law in other settings,
see TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF LIFE (2002)
(emphasizing the importance of coordinated time for cultural and civic life and development
of social cohesion), reviewed by Orly Lobel, Book Review: The Law of Social Time, 76 TEMP.
L. REV. 357 (2003); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001) (emphasizing a constitution's role in linking people with their
particular past over time).
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A classical conception of a constitution, in John Marshall's words,
is that it is not only a foundational law, but also one that is
"intended to endure for ages to come:
75
That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the
whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this
original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to
be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established,
are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be
permanent.7
6
Thus, making a constitution is a "very great exertion'-an exercise
that happens at a discrete time; the principles it establishes are
"deemed fundamental" and form a "supreme" law, clearly "designed
to be permanent. 7
Ruti Teitel argues that transitional constitutions do not fit this
classical model, but have a number of distinctive characteristics.
78
First, they are "not created all at once but in fits and starts." 9
Second, they are often explicitly provisional, anticipating that they
will be replaced by subsequent, more permanent constitutions.
Third, she suggests, transitional constitutions look both backwards
to the past and forwards to the future, while classical constitutions
are forward-looking instruments. Finally, Teitel argues that tran-
sitional constitutions can be understood as a stage in the develop-
75. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). For a different view, see
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 396 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958), quoted in
David Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J.
1717, 1721 (2003) (arguing that constitutions ought to expire or be readopted every nineteen
years). See also infra note 88.
76. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. TEITEL, supra note 15, at 191,195-97. In Teitel's discussion, transitional constitutions
embrace both nominally transitional constitutions and processes of incremental
constitutional change in the wake of regime shift from military or authoritarian to
democratic modes. See id.
79. Id. at 196.
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ment of a Rawlsian consensus, which emerges gradually over time
through multiple iterations of constitutional negotiation change."0
Constitutions as forward and backward looking: Yet these
characteristics of transitional constitutions may not be so distinc-
tive on closer examination. In a sense, all constitutions look both
backward and forward."' "Post-conflict," as expressed in the title to
this Symposium, is itself a complicated idea. All human societies
have conflicts, and ongoing conflict within society often motivates
constitutional change. It is in part the nature of the conflict the
society has previously experienced, and the nature of the conflicts
that remain, that help frame the challenges faced by constitution
makers. Whether constitutions emerge in the wake of fundamental
regime change (e.g., from authoritarian or military control towards
democracy) or from within an ongoing democratic polity, whether
they are regarded as "clean breaks" or as incrementalist change,
constitutions provide links to a particular past-perhaps imagined
and mythic, and certainly partial. Without a linkage to some
imagined past, constitutions could not do the work of helping to
constitute a particular community. 2 All national communities in
this age of constitutions have some imagined past identity, 3
contested, to be sure, and only some strands of which will be
reflected in the legal regime. Yet the ability of constitutions to
create narratives that link generations over time is an important
80. See id. (emphasizing how ongoing change in the constitutional order produces change
in the participants' perspectives, which in turn affects the "potential for constitutional
consensus').
81. I discuss this further in a forthcoming book, VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
COSMOLOGY: CONVERGENCE, RESISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT IN TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming 2008).
82. See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Constitution Between Past and Future, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1377 (2008); cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6-7 (rev. ed. 1991)
(defining a"nation" as an 'imagined political community," one that is "inherently limited and
sovereign"; imagined because its members do not all know each other and limited because
"[n]o nation imagines itself as coterminous with mankind").
83. Cf. TEITEL, supra note 15, at 196 ("While the picture of a polis at constitutional point
zero might have been appropriate for describing constitutionalism in the eighteenth century,
in the late twentieth century, constitutions associated with political change generally succeed
preexisting constitutional regimes and are thus not simply created anew."). Implicit in this
observation is the possibility that all new constitutions are in some sense transitional,
backward-looking as well as forward-looking.
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aspect of the durability of those that do endure,84 whether the
linkage is one of embrace or rejection of a particular past.
Moreover, the incremental quality of constitution-making,
moving, in Teitel's words, in "fits and starts," can be found in many
constitutional settings, including the accretion of the British
constitution over centuries, or the incremental expansion of the
voting citizenry that amendments to the U.S. Constitution created
between 1865 and 1971.85 The adoption of the Israeli Basic Laws,
a process that has now stretched over half a century and may
continue, is another example of incremental constitutional develop-
ment that is not necessarily indicative of fundamental regime
change.8"
Distinguishing a category of "transitional" constitutions becomes
even more difficult when one considers that avowedly transitional
constitutions may become permanent, as was the case with the
German Basic Law; consensus may develop over time in a wide
variety of ways. And even "permanent" constitutions are, in a sense,
also in transition: any constitution that "lasts" must have a capacity
to be "transitional" in allowing for contest over changing under-
standings and new circumstances, whether through amendment
or interpretation. Thus, constitution-making can be incremental
without necessarily being distinctively transitional.
Entrenchment and Endurance Disaggregated? Still, there are
differences between transitional and permanent constitutions, and
among different forms of transitional constitutional processes. The
avowedly unsettled or incomplete nature of the agreement in a
nominally transitional constitution is distinctive. While in place,
these transitional or interim agreements assert their status as
foundational and supreme, and they often provide amendment rules
designed to "entrench" their superiority until they are changed in
84. Cf. RUBENFELD, supra note 74, at 12 (describing constitutional law as allowing a
people to "memorialize and hold itself' to commitments over time).
85. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (1865) (abolishing slavery), XIV, §2 (1868) (providing
incentives for states to allow black men to vote), XV (1870) (securing right to vote regardless
of race or prior condition of servitude), XIX (1920) (securing women's right to vote), XXIII
(1961) (extending right to vote for President to residents of the District of Columbia), XXIV
(1964) (prohibiting poll taxes for voting), XVI (1971) (extending right to vote to those eighteen
or older).
86. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text and supra note 24.
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accordance with the rules specified. 7 Transitional constitutions
thus may disaggregate the features of legal entrenchment and
supremacy, on the one hand, and legal endurance, on the other. In
so doing, and depending on their performance and that of subse-
quently enacted constitutions, they may shed new light on the
advantages and disadvantages of constitutional "sunset" clauses-
that is, requirements of reconsideration in plenary form after a set
period of years, far enough into the future to allow time for the
development of some authoritative institutions of politics and
governance.88
Some transitional constitutions seek not only to entrench
themselves as law for a short period of time, but also to advance
entrenched principles or rules from which future constitution
makers cannot depart. This was a distinctive feature of the South
African process. The non-elected members of the South African
Multi-party Negotiating Process decided on the thirty-four basic
principles to which the later constitution must conform and
determined that the Constitutional Court would enforce this
requirement.89 This conduct might be viewed as a form of partial,
87. See, e.g., Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq: Key Provisions
of the Transitional Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269, 274 (2005-06) ("Article
3 [of Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)] makes clear that, regardless of
nomenclature, the TAL is in fact an interim constitution in all but name. Article (3)(A) makes
the TAL the supreme law of Iraq, superseding any legislation."); id. (stating that the TAL's
provisional nature is indicated by Article 3(C), which states that the TAL "shall cease to have
effect upon the formation of an elected government pursuant to a permanent constitution").
Al-Istrabadi is identified as "Ambassador and Alternate Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations," who was "one of the principal legal drafters of the Iraq Transitional
Administrative Law and was the principle author of its bill of rights." Id. at 269 n.*.
88. See supra note 75 (noting Thomas Jefferson's view); see also Jacob E. Gerson,
Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 254-55 (2007) (describing more of Jefferson's
correspondence with Madison on this point); cf. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (providing that at
a general election, at least every twenty years, the people must vote on whether to hold a
convention to revise or amend the state constitution).
89. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 280-85. The Northern Ireland Agreement
also provides for a set of rights that are to be respected whatever the outcome of later
referenda on sovereignty and national identity, and provides for the establishment of specific
institutions, including a Human Rights Commission, to protect those rights. See Paul
Mageean & Martin O'Brien, From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the
Good Friday Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1499, 1519-25, 1527-28 (1999); Christopher
McCrudden, Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM
INT'LL.J. 1696, 1734-38 (1999); Brendan O'Leary, The Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1628, 1649-50 (1999).
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long-term entrenchment. Whether the normative force of such pre-
binding efforts is derived from the subsequent decision of the polity
to treat them as binding (i.e., by consent), or from their substantive
normative force (in some instances, as "supra-positive" norms of
international constitutionalism),9 ° can be debated but perhaps not
disentangled: the substantive force of the principles may contribute
to the willingness of both judicial and political actors to treat them
as binding.
Will the separation of entrenchment and permanence in these
transitional instruments help to move societies closer to
constitutionalism, democracy, and justice? Does incremental, or
transitional, constitution-making better promote the chances for
constitutionalism and democracy in riven societies? Do severely
rifted societies with little practice in democracy need a modest and
restrained, rather than comprehensive and perfectionist, gover-
nance instrument?91 As will be discussed below, the answers to
these questions will lie in part with the particular interests and
aspirations of those with power in the constitution-making process.
Interests and Constraints, Internal and External: The interests of
those drafting constitutions in "transitional" settings must at this
point be considered.92 To the extent that drafters of constitutions
90. See generally Gerald Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony
and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863 (2003).
91. Cf. Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216 (1999)
(arguing for a restrained role of courts in societies with deep conflict about political
decisions). I raise here a question of the scope and ambition of the constitutional (or proto-
constitutional) instrument, rather than the related question about how highly it is
entrenched, as discussed in Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of
Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 275 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
92. As noted earlier, constitutional provisions (or processes) may actually obstruct
constitutionalism. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 267-68. Such provisions may
reflect the institutional or personal interests of influential participants. Cf. SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND
WHAT WE THE PEOPLE CAN Do ABOUT IT) 62, 90 (2006) (arguing for a new constitutional
convention to remedy anti-democratic and unjust features of the U.S. Constitution, including
provisions for "equal suffrage" in the Senate, reflecting interests of small states, and the
rules of the Electoral College, which used to provide advantages to voters in slaveholding
states); Elster, supra note 1, at 377 (noting Charles Beard's argument (no longer widely
accepted) that the U.S. Constitution was designed to entrench the economic interests of its
drafters). Query whether provisions like the rule of two Senators per state, or those
protecting former dictators from loss of power or from punishment (as in Chile's designation
of Pinochet as Senator-for-life) might be seen as at times promoting and, at other times,
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are members of the polity, they are necessarily self-interested in
ways that can be both important to and problematic for success.
Internal drafters who were the victors in a long struggle against an
oppressive past may be motivated, as Bruce Ackerman contem-
plates, by an altruism born of having "sacrificed much of their lives
for certain fundamental principles."93 But internal drafters for a
regime brought down by outside forces may or may not have had
the time or civic space to develop a competing vision that would
carry forward a constitution-drafting process and thus may end up
focused on the more particular interests of their segments of
society.9 4 Depending on these and other circumstances, internal
drafters may be better situated to produce a more, or less, transi-
tional constitution with more, or less, of an effort to embed en-
trenched principles.
Where those who are drafting constitutions (or imposing
constraints on what is drafted) are not members of the polity-for
example, the Americans who drafted the Japanese constitution
95
-they may be able to take a more dispassionate view of the
interests of the whole. However, outside drafters, particularly when
dominated by a single powerful country, may well also have
particular national interests which they seek to advance through
constitutional constraints imposed on the other.9 In either case,
their activity will be less "authentic" and, in many cases, they will
be less knowledgeable about the conditions and cultural histories
that must inform successful constitution-making. Acceptance of
obstructing constitutionalism?
93. ACKERMAN, LIBERALREVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 48-53, 55, 64; cf. id. at 62 (arguing
further that immediate constitution-making will help secure revolutionary leaders'
commitments; once political elites sign on to the text, they "will find it hard to play fast and
loose with it to serve their short-run interests").
94. See supra note 58 (discussing Iraq). A comparative study of the pre-transitional
organizing and development of constitutional ideas in successful and less successful
transitions would be illuminating.
95. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, The United States, Cuba, and the Platt Amendment,
1901, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/86557.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (describing
how the United States insisted that Cuba include in its own constitution (1901) the
provisions of the Platt Amendment enacted by the U.S. Congress, forbidding Cuba from
entering into certain foreign agreements and providing for U.S. intervention to defend Cuba
as conditions for an end to U.S. military occupation); see also Paul D. Carrington, Could and
Should America Have Made an Ottoman Republic in 1919?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1071,
1086-87 (2008).
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such a constitution will depend on the degree to which internal
drafters and ratifiers and people can be persuaded to adopt it as
their own.97
Effective drafting by insiders to the system is thus fraught with
the difficulty of effectively compromising the combinations of
self-interest and public interest at the table; constitutional drafting
by, or under, the strong influence of outsiders (even assuming their
altruistic intentions) risks delegitimation of the constitutional
project by proxy. And in either situation, the presence or absence of
the forms of entrenchment associated with "traditional" constitu-
tions can influence the drafting process. As noted earlier, promul-
gating an entrenched and enduring law raises the stakes for the
endeavor, because whatever is done will be harder to undo.
Sometimes raising the stakes can be a good thing for a lawmaking
process by focusing attention, demanding and thus justifying the
devotion of considerable time. If some significant leaders take it
seriously, others may need to as well, and permanent guarantees
may be needed to assure the different parties to a negotiation that
their interests will remain protected. On the other hand, sometimes
raising the stakes by requiring that all elements of an agreement
be permanent can be a bad thing for successful conflict resolu-
tion-intensifying polarization and leading to more rigid positions
than might occur in negotiations over more temporary solutions.9"
And without some minimal levels of trust in legal institutions or
their guarantors, constitutional design of checking institutions may
not be enough to overcome suspicion and fear.99
97. That is, outside intervention or constraint on internal drafting may result in the
inclusion of provisions-whether they concern human rights or the protection of other
nations' sovereign or commercial interests-that are not internalized by the governments or
people involved (though this may occur with indigenously drafted provisions as well).
98. On the challenges that polarization presents for conflict resolution and the benefits
of consensus-building in resolving multi-party disputes, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 81 (2002)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer as Consensus Builder]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace
and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes: Inaugural Lecture of the
A.B. Chettle, Jr. Chair in Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 568, 571-
72 (2006) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice]. See also supra note 63 (referring
to conflict resolution literature and the importance of small first steps to building trust).
99. To the extent that entrenchment raises the stakes too high, some suggest it can be
addressed by a relaxed amendment formula. Cf. Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 91, at 275
(arguing that constitutions in the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe should be easily
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Yet some agreements not called "constitutions" may end up
functioning very much like them, where the politics of the moment
lend urgency and force to the need to have the kind of hard
deliberation characteristic of good constitution-making. Perhaps the
Northern Ireland Multi-party Agreements will end up being so
viewed eventually, as a decision of the British law lords suggests. 00
If so, perhaps it will be seen as an example in which more was
accomplished towards constitutionalism, in part by claiming
somewhat less. 10'
Transitional constitution-making often involves non-national
participants-international organizations, human rights activists,
occupying or former colonial powers. Some transitional instruments
contemplate the formal involvement of an extra-national element
in governance, as in the Northern Ireland agreements. Avowedly
transitional constitutions offer the possibility of a staged approach,
combining insider and outsider participation. In theory, transitional
constitution-making permits segmenting the time periods when
international elements have an explicit role-that is, at the
transitional, but not the more final, stages. 0 2 It thereby may offer
amendable in some provisions (including social rights) in order to allow space for democratic
parliamentary majorities to have scope for lawmaking).
100. See Robinson v. Sec'y of State for N. Ir., [2002] UKHL 32, 25 (Eng.) (Lord Hoffman),
available at http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd020725/robin-
2.htm ("[Tihe Belfast Agreement concluded on Good Friday 1998 ... was the product of
multi-party negotiations to devise constitutional arrangements for a fresh start in Northern
Ireland.... The 1998 Act is a constitution for Northern Ireland, framed to create a continuing
form of government against the background of the history of the territory and the principles
agreed in Belfast."). Commentators emphasize the importance of the submission of that
Agreement to popular referendum for its quasi-constitutional status. See, e.g., Kieran
McEvoy & John Morison, Beyond the "Constitutional Moment" Law, Transition, and
Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 961, 968 (2003).
101. Calling for people to produce a "constitution" (so-named) may increase the stakes
because of the expressive and constitutive aspects of constitution-making. See supra note 10
and accompanying text; infra notes 139-66 and accompanying text; cf. Elster, supra note 1,
at 378-84 (comparing the institutional and group interests, or stakes, at work in U.S. and
French constitution-making in the late eighteenth century). Entering into "multi-party
negotiations," as occurred in Northern Ireland, did not require parties to take a position on
their permanent national identity; making a "constitution" might do so. See infra notes 152-
57 and accompanying text. Query whether a document called the "Constitution" could have
been approved by popular referendum at the time of the Good Friday Agreements, given the
questions of national identity implicated by the term, even if (counterfactually) the interested
state parties would have permitted it to go forward on that basis?
102. Northern Ireland may end up illustrating this possibility. See supra note 100.
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some possibility of mediating among the interests of insiders and
outsiders to the end of legitimate constitutions and working
constitutionalism.
Interests, Identities, and Multi-phase Transitions: Teitel's
concept of the transitional constitution as part of a constructivist,
deliberative project by which areas of consensus are developed over
time is a normatively attractive one, which assumes that the
product of more talking will be more consensus.'0 3 The South
African example is a powerful one, a remarkable transformation of
an unjust, minority-dominated system built on the abuse, subordi-
nation, and political exclusion of a racial majority by a racial
minority into one that accepted full adult suffrage and the seismic
shift in political power that entailed. Although South Africa's
constitutional transition has by no means been easy or successful
across the board-particularly in the achievement of its constitu-
tional aspirations for more economic justice and meeting minimal
human requirements for housing and medical care° 4-it nonethe-
less must be counted as a substantial success in the direction in
which it has moved the country on measures of justice and
constitutionalism.
A number of scholars have also argued that South Africa's
constitutional transformation-and in particular, its development
of the formal two-stage process-is an important innovation in
constitution-making, one that provides a means for combining
constitutional "learning" (from experience with democratic politics
and governance) and constitutional legitimacy (by more full-fledged
democratic participation in later stages)." 5 On such accounts, the
goal of this transitional process may be understood as establishing
103. But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 75 (2000) (suggesting that if people are talking in groups of the like-minded,
more talking can lead to more polarization). On structuring the conditions of deliberation to
enhance prospects for consensus-building and avoid polarization, see, for example, Menkel-
Meadow, Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 98, at 81-82, 104 (discussing, inter
alia, Lawrence Susskind's work, such as THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999)).
104. See, e.g., Gov't of Republic of South Africa v Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 2 (S.
Afr.) (decided Oct. 4, 2000) (referring to "the intolerable conditions under which many of our
people are still living," notwithstanding constitutional provisions for progressively realizing
the goal of providinga right of access to adequate housing).
105. See, e.g., Arato, supra note 26, at 26-28.
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the conditions for informed democratic decision-making about the
constitution: decisions which may or may not represent a Rawlsian
consensus, °6 but rather an agreement that can be lived with-a
modus vivendi, if not a true consensus. Professor Klug's argument
focuses less on cognition and learning, and more on habits of
argument-of the participants becoming enmeshed in a discourse
around legal principles. 107 Even on these more modest accounts, the
innovation is an important one in moving towards conditions of
constitutionalism. But the preconditions for its use may not always
be present.
A more modest conception of interim agreements is that their
goal is only to maintain the use of law talk, rather than violence,
through a series of interim agreements. On this view, the idea of
post-conflict constitutionalism may be committed to a vision of
constitutions as a form of continuous conversation, of imperma-
nency, and of disentrenchment, but not necessarily, as Teitel
envisions, a form of disentrenchment of the old while moving
towards entrenchment of a more normatively attractive rule of law
and construction of a more positive national identity.18 Consecutive
interim agreements with much more limited (or nonexistent)
aspirations to bind the future beyond the term of the agreement
may represent a substitute for consecutive cycles of violence and,
while not necessarily conducive to long-term institution building,
may be all that is achievable for some periods of time.'0 9 Although
such open-ended "constitutional" processes have some severe
disadvantages, including their difficulty in developing stable insti-
tutions through which social conflicts are managed, in a context in
which constitutions are being used as tools of peacemaking in an
106. See TEITEL, supra note 15, at 196.
107. See Klug, South African Miracle, supra note 53, at 23-35; cf. KLUG, CONSTITUTING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 137 (describing negotiations as producing an "unconscious
process of hybridization" of international and local norms).
108. See TEITEL, supra note 15, at 196, 198.
109. Cf. MORROW, WEAK VIABILITY, supra note 59, at 1-2 (arguing that the Iraqi
constitution 'lacks the essential criterion of any constitution: the consent of all major
national communities," but that it may nonetheless be sufficient as a 'legal text" to provide
a framework for a "radically regionalized ... polity," and suggesting that the amendment
process might be used to make recommendations for legislation and intergovernmental or
international agreements to encourage Sunni Arab engagement with the constitution and
promote preservation of the Iraqi state).
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ongoing conflict it may be necessary to develop not a two-staged,
but a multi-staged use of transitional agreements as preferable to
the coercion of arms.
Depending on the political circumstances, transitional agree-
ments have the capacity to move in more normatively attractive
directions. If competing ascriptive or ideological groups in society
have relatively equal power, or if a current majority group foresees
its power waning in the future, or if all major groups face similar
degrees of uncertainty, continuous bargaining may well lead to a
more or less acceptable entrenched agreement embodied in a liberal
constitution because leaders of each group see advantages in
making such an agreement." ° Alternatively, if the group at the
negotiating table with the strongest power has what Arato calls
an "orientation to democratic consensus," ' these transitional
processes may well lead towards the possibility of a workable
constitution. On the other hand, more permanent or forward-
looking agreements may be particularly difficult to arrive at in
circumstances in which one or more powerful groups believes it will
be in a better position to strike a deal at some future time; more
conversation in a short time in those circumstances might yield
less, rather than more, consensus. As noted earlier, if groups
believe that as their numbers rise in the future they will have more
power, they might seek to maintain the possibility of easy amend-
ment or further interim agreements. What may forestall the latter
possibility is the political exhaustion principle-that people are not
willing to devote unlimited time and attention to fundamental
lawmaking." 2
Yet where issues of identity are at stake, as increasingly they
are,"' it is not difficult to envision cycles of animosity that may
require the work of several "interim" agreements before a stable
constitutional settlement is reached. To the extent that a "constitu-
tion"-in contrast to an interim agreement-must express a
110. On the incentives of a present majority group that sees its number and power waning
in the future to agree to constitution-like protections that may currently benefit a rising
minority, see Donald L. Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources
of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 193, 204 (2002).
111. Arato, supra note 26, at 17.
112. See ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 55.
113. See generally Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superelan: Loyalty, Identity and
Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1996).
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national identity (as well as provide mechanisms for allocating and
sharing government power), moving from transitional to final may
be particularly problematic in deeply riven societies, as many post-
conflict societies will be. Interim agreements, to gain consent, may
have the effect of reinforcing group cohesion. Depending on the
nature of group leadership, and the incentives vel non which voting
schemes may provide for the rise of extremist positions within
differentiated groups,114 one could imagine arrangements that
exacerbate rather than improve prospects for agreement on a
workable, permanent constitution.
Given the importance of political preconditions for the likely
success of constitution-making in any of these forms, the expertise
of constitutional lawyers in other ongoing systems will be of only
limited relevance in post-regime change settings. Expertise in local
history and politics, in comparative governance, in political tran-
sitions and decisional processes, as well as comparative knowledge
of successful and unsuccessful constitutions and approaches to
constitution-making, should be brought to bear.'15 How much there
is to know or think about in deciding on the form of constitution-
making that should occur is further illustrated below.
114. See Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in THE
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 15, 20-25, 29-30 (noting problems that
consociational accounts have with identifying incentives for agreement by majorities to share
power with minorities, noting significance of fact that each group may have more extreme
and more moderate elements, and arguing for vote pooling arrangements to provide
incentives for moderation and agreement); cf. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 75 (on problems
of group polarization). At an extreme, polarization and intensification of ethnic or religious
conflicts may lead to "ethnic cleansing," or secession. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC
GROUPS IN CONFLICT xi (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS]; see also
Thomas M. Franck, Why Federations Fail, in WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL 167 (Thomas M.
Franck ed., 1968).
115. For a thoughtful argument for including "process experts" with experience in
facilitating consensus-building in legal settings, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's
Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2005). But see Mark Tushnet, Some
Skepticism About Normative ConstitutionalAdvice, 49 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1473, 1474(2008)
(suggesting that normative advice on constitution-making processes or substantive
provisions is "largely pointless'). Although I share Tushnet's view that the role of local
conditions and the variety and distinctiveness of constitution-making processes preclude
development of anything approaching a "blueprint" for advice-giving, I am not so pessimistic
about the benefits of sharing knowledge. Awareness of a broad range of successful and
unsuccessful constitution-making efforts, and some understanding of how each different
example proceeded in its own context, may be helpful to the exercise of sound judgment in
future situations notwithstanding the absence of fully replicable conditions.
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C. Timing and Process
The existence of alternative modes of constitution-making
means that it is a question whether traditional, comprehensive
constitution-making should always be a priority in post-conflict
societies or whether less ambitious pre-constitutional agreements
should instead have priority, at least in some circumstances. South
Africa, Hungary, and even Northern Ireland illustrate different
strategies of interim or incremental constitution-making. They
suggest that constitution drafters' tool kits must be expanded
beyond the all-encompassing models of constitution-making
represented by the United States and post-World War II German
and Japanese episodes.
1. Timing
Timing-that is, choosing a constitutional "moment" or a series
of "moments" along a temporal continuum moving towards
constitutionalism -is a first question. Constitutional processes are
normatively desirable, generally, to lay a foundation for legal
provisions for stable and just democratic politics; democratic
politics are not possible absent a basic set of rules and units for
voting, provisions usually found (at least in general terms) in
constitutions." 6 But the moment for constitution-drafting is not
always, or even usually, an entirely autochthonous choice in post-
conflict settings. Occupying powers may insist on drafting a
constitution for their own purposes and powerful external bodies
may offer incentives to do so. Even where external pressures are
less intense, the association of a written constitution with national
identity and national sovereignty and the desire, whether for
altruistic or other reasons, to establish an enduring basic frame-
work for governance, may quickly lead domestic actors to the
constitution-drafting table. Relatedly, constitutions may be im-
portant symbols of aspiration to indicate a clean break from the
116. Although it may be that "all election mechanisms are vulnerable to manipulation by
a variety of means," Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 595 (2002) (noting insights of Condorcet and Arrow), it is nonetheless an
essential aspect of any framework for rule of law governance that the means of choosing the
government (as well as the rules by which it regulates conduct) be decided upon and known.
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past; in Iraq, for example, the interim nature of constitutions under
prior regimes may itself have given momentum to a desire quickly
to have a permanent constitution to differentiate the past.117 The
more general point is that there may not be as much choice as
might be imagined about whether and when to have a constitu-
tion-drafting process-any choice is often highly constrained.
In light of the normative and practical benefits of having a
constitution," 8 there is much to be said for relatively speedy moves
toward constitution-making. Yet post-World War II Japan and
Germany should not be understood to stand in general for the
capacity of an occupying power to insist on constitution-making on
a (relatively) quick schedule, especially in significantly riven
societies, that will turn out to be successful. Experience else-
where-in Eastern Europe, South Africa, and Northern Ireland, for
example-may suggest that the kinds of bargaining that constitu-
tional compromises typically entail are better achieved through
more limited forms of agreement made over a longer period of time.
Yet, depending in part on the nature of different groups' leadership
and incentives and the amount of agreement among those groups
over what the conflict did or did not resolve, more time could be
used for purposes destructive of the capacities for peaceful and
humane self-governance.
2. Process
In addition to questions of whether to engage in interim or final
constitution-making, some political scientists and lawyers argue for
particular kinds of processes-for example, separate "conventions"
(rather than standing general legislative bodies) to draft constitu-
tions-both to avoid the institutional and personal self-interest of
existing members of legislative bodies and to better embody the
interests of the people in a specifically constitutional process." 9 Yet
117. See Brown, supra note 57, at 928-29, 932-35 (describing Iraq's use of interim
constitutions that did not constrain executive power, from 1958 until the U.S. invasion in
2003).
118. That is, of having a good constitution. On the possibility that constitutions may, by
design or otherwise, obstruct development of constitutionalism and a just constitutional
order, see supra notes 13, 92.
119. See, e.g., AcKERMAN, LIBERALREVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 58-60; Elster, supra note
1, at 395.
1292 [Vol. 49:1249
WHAT'S IN A NAME?
enough examples exist of successful parliamentary adoptions to
make one skeptical of insisting on this one form. 120 In societies
without existing representative institutions and in which constitu-
tions are being used as tools of peacemaking and social transforma-
tion, the constitutional process might contribute to representative
government by linking the drafting of the constitution to new
institutions of democratic governance, as in South Africa. Each
process thus has distinctive advantages and disadvantages.
Moreover, although there is arguably an emerging international
consensus that "legitimate" constitution-making requires public
participation or ratification, 121 history suggests that a fairly wide
range of processes may, over time, create bonds of legitimacy
between a constitutional instrument and a majority of the polity to
which it applies. In deeply riven societies, some democratic
processes have the capacity to deepen rather than bridge differ-
ences. 122 Although the Iraqi constitution-making process appears to
have allowed inadequate time for discussion and compromise, and
as structured resulted in a decidedly negative vote in the Sunni
areas notwithstanding which the constitution went into effect, one
cannot say in any categorical way that contemporaneous consent of
all minority groups is necessary for successful constitutional
change. 123 Depending on existing social and political norms,
120. Neither the Polish nor the Hungarian constitutions were drafted by specially elected
constitutional conventions; rather, standing legislatures enacted changes that had been
negotiated through informal processes and, in the Polish case, the new constitution was then
also approved by popular referendum. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text; see also
ELSTER, OFFE & PREUSS, supra note 45, at 70 (discussing Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Czech
legislatures' drafting or amending constitutions as part of regime change).
121. See, e.g., VIVIEN HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONMAKING 1, 12 (U.S. Inst. of Peace,
Special Rep. No. 107, July 2003), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
srl07.pdf; cf. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992) (suggesting that international law is coming to recognize a right to
democratic governance).
122. See HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS, supra note 114, at 628-33. Voting rules, coupled with
information about the vote, may have other destabilizing effects. Some observers believe that
the overwhelmingly negative vote of Sunni provinces on the Iraq Constitution left the Shiite
and Kurd groups feeling less of a sense of moral obligation to the Sunnis to make revisions
as contemplated by the last-minute addition of Article 142. See MORROW, WEAK VIABILITY,
supra note 59, at 5-6; cf. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) (arguing that
democracy itself, combined with free markets in many developing nations, may lead to a
release of ethnic hatred directed at "market-dominant minorities").
123. See supra note 68 (noting that Quebec did not consent to Canada's 1982 Charter).
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constitutions negotiated by elite representatives of groups-
whether in a special assembly or convention or in a representative
parliamentary body-may prove sufficiently durable to move
towards constitutionalism without having the added qualities of
legitimately entrenched law that popular ratification may be
thought to provide. Perhaps all one can say is that establishing a
purportedly representative or democratic process for constitution-
making and then prematurely cutting off deliberation among
intensely polarized groups is a high-risk approach, carrying within
it the elements of its own delegitimation.
If there are more general conclusions to be drawn about timing,
process, and scope of constitution-making projects in post-conflict
societies, this is not the province for constitutional lawyers alone.
As noted earlier, such judgments call for the insights of historians,
political scientists, cultural anthropologists, and conflict resolution
specialists. To the extent that lawyers are involved, the "tool kit"
they bring to developing agreements that work towards the rule of
law and a more just society must be an expanded one,124 including
not only capital "C" constitutions but also working agreements,
power-sharing agreements, basic laws, and interim constitutions.
Drafting temporary agreements for elected legislatures and
governing bodies (through voting systems that do not more deeply
entrench existing cleavages), while temporarily deferring decision-
making on contested issues, may allow time for habits of compro-
mise and living together under law to be established where need be.
For instance, the Northern Ireland agreement called for continued
transnational involvement in the difficult issue of prisoner releases
over a two-year time frame and provided for the future establish-
ment of a commission to evaluate and make recommendations on
policing. 125 Similarly, when the two Germanys came together,
resolution of the abortion regime was deferred, again to within a
two-year time frame. 126
124. See Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice, supra note 98, at 568, 571-72; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Practicing Law "In the Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-First Century: Pursuing
Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1770-74 (2002).
125. See Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations arts. 9-10, Apr. 10, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 751.
126. See PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF
GERMAN UNIFICATION 156-57 (1997) (describing how the Unification Treaty permitted the
former German Democratic Republic (GDR) to maintain for the transition period its own
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D. Independent Guarantors: Courts
Despite the increasingly democratic orientation of normative
constitutional legitimacy under which public deliberation and
ratification are believed necessary, the use of non-democratic,
"independent" elements to secure the guarantees of an interim or
permanent constitution may also have an important role to play in
deeply polarized settings. The role of the Constitutional Court in
South Africa is a notable example: created by the (non-democrati-
cally chosen) multi-party negotiators and enacted into law by the
(non-democratic) prior regime's legislature, the Constitutional
Court in South Africa was charged with reviewing the final
constitution to assure its compliance with the thirty-four negotiated
basic principles. 127 Although it is difficult to justify this court's
creation through a theory of democratic consent, its independence
from the prior regime and its high stature enabled it to perform the
vital role of offering assurance to all parties that the rights and
structures they negotiated for would be carried forward. 121 Argu-
ably, incorporation of international or foreign law or actors in
constitutional regimes, discussed in the next Section, can play a
similar role in offering some form of non-democratic, but independ-
ent, check on the range of outcomes permissible under fragile new
constitutional processes.
E. International Guarantors and Involvement: Constitutions as
Janus-faced
Classical understandings of a "constitution" are inward-looking.
In the U.S. paradigm, the Constitution is conceived exclusively as
the product of, and governing instrument for, "We the people of the
United States"-a specific and territorially bounded polity. Yet
many of the written constitutions of the world have been the
abortion law, which permitted abortions relatively freely in contrast to the law of West
Germany, and also added an article to the Basic Law "to suspend certain provisions of the
Basic Law, for an interim period, through an amendment of the Basic Law itself'); cf. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting federal regulation of the slave trade for twenty years).
127. See supra notes 47, 50 and accompanying text.
128. For an argument that the South African court's 2005 decision invalidating the death
penalty helped establish the court's authority as protector of human rights and interpreter
of the constitution, see KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 142-48.
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product of a combination of external and internal forces. Occupying
powers, including the United States (and well before the reconstitu-
tion of Japan and Germany after World War II), have sought to
impose on or persuade other peoples as to what should be in their
constitutions.'29 Despite the inward focus of much discussion about
constitutions, national constitutions also matter to a transnational
community: they help define state sovereignty for purposes of
recognition, they structure the state's capacities to deal with other
states, and they may affect the capacity of the states to comply with
international norms of interest to all member nations, including
those against offensive war and those protecting human rights.
Even constitutions that are in important respects highly indigenous
products must face outwards as well as inwards in order to
accomplish their goals, which include asserting and securing the
sovereign capacities of the state on the international stage.13 °
In a number of recently adopted constitutional instruments,
international law and/or members of the international community
are present.'31 In South Africa, the indigenous constitution-making
process was framed and informed by international opposition to the
apartheid regime and support for the move to a new democratic
constitutional regime. International law itself played an important
role in the South African process: according to Professor Klug, all
of the principal negotiators by the early 1990s had accepted that a
new constitution for South Africa would need to meet criteria set
forth in international instruments condemning the apartheid
129. See supra note 96.
130. Although a written constitution is plainly not necessary for a state to be recognized
as a sovereign in the international community, constitutions typically do address the criteria
and parameters of recognition, including capacity to deal with foreign nations, and
particularly in post-colonial settings are widely and explicitly used to assert sovereignty.
Compare Montevideo Convention art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 U.S.T. 3097 (describing the
elements of a state under international law), with 1958 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) ("The French
people solemnly proclaim ... the principles of national sovereignty."); 1994 CONST. OF THE
FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA pmbl. ("We the Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples of.); and 1995 CONST. OF UGANDA art. IV (discussing the constitution's guarantee
of national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity). I explore this further in
JACKSON, supra note 81.
131. The increasing trend of international interventions in constitution-making has drawn
notice from other scholars. See, e.g., Ulrich K. Preuss, Perspectives on Post-conflict
Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through External Constitutionalization,
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 467, 491-93 (2006) (describing "constitutional intervention" as
analogous to "humanitarian intervention").
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system.132 And the interim and final constitutions made use of
international law as a reference point for interpretation, requiring
that international law be considered in interpreting the bill of
rights and that all statutes be interpreted, whenever possible, in
accordance with international law. 133 One can see this as a mild
way in which a domestic constitution reaches out to use interna-
tional law as a check on its own constitutional development, while
at the same time inviting international scrutiny of whether the
domestic constitution meets the international standards to which
it aspires.
Other transitional constitutional instruments have created
specific governmental roles for international or foreign powers. For
example, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted
under international auspices as part of the Dayton Accords,3 4
recognizes international monitoring bodies operating within the
state and provides for a Constitutional Court, three of whose nine
members are selected by the President of the European Court of
Human Rights. 135 As noted, the Northern Ireland agreements
provide for fairly extensive sharing of powers among governmental
organs in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and the United
Kingdom.136 And, as suggested by growing arguments for "shared
sovereignty" arrangements, 137 constitutions are no longer viewed as
132. See Klug, South African Miracle, supra note 53, at 22-24 (explaining how the ANC's
"Constitutional Principles," published in 1988, and their "internationalization ... through the
Harare Declaration [of a subcommittee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)] and in
the UN General Assembly's Declaration Against Apartheid in 1989" established parameters
for the process of constitution-making).
133. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 arts. 39, 233; S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 35. Although the
international community's opposition to the apartheid regime may make South Africa's a
special case, many constitutions in the last thirty years have been strongly influenced by
international human rights regimes. For example, Canada adopted a Charter of Rights in
1982, inspired in part by the ICCPR; Argentina and Colombia, which adopted new
constitutions in the 1990s, incorporated commitments to international human rights law in
their constitutional texts. See CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 75(22); POLITICAL CONST. COLOM.
(1991) art 93.
134. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina art. V &
annex 4, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 89.
135. See CONST. OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA arts. II, VI; see also id. at art. VII (providing for
appointment by International Monetary Fund of a member of the initial board of the Central
Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
136. See O'Leary, supra note 89, at 1641-50.
137. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and
Failing States, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 2004, at 85, 85.
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solely a matter of domestic concern nor as requiring, for their
practical efficacy, an entirely autochthonous process of adoption or
implementation.
Provisions for international involvement may be understood as
different forms of "guarantee" or "check" on the outcomes of
domestic processes-important especially to the protection of
different minority groups-that have some analogies to the role of
the Constitutional Court in South Africa. Whether such shared
arrangements can continue indefinitely-whether as both a
practical and theoretical matter such foreign participation in
domestic governance can be reconciled with political and normative
constitutional legitimacy-or must instead be justified as leading
towards a more fully domesticated constitution, is an important
question beyond the scope of this essay. Here I note only that
domestic approval of international involvement, or of the role of a
constitutional court, goes at least part of the way to solving some of
the legitimacy problems. 8 A larger point is that the provisions for
international involvement found in some transitional constitutions
make palpable, in an unusually expressive way, the "outward"
facing functions of all domestic constitutions.
F. A Rose by Any Other Name? Naming the Governance
Instrument
As already noted, it is not unheard of for the use of the word
"constitution" to be a barrier to agreement.139 Naming an instru-
ment a constitution is an implicit claim about identity. Thus, even
without a commitment to long-term entrenchment, the sovereignty-
asserting and identity-establishing connotations of the idea of a
"constitution" may create barriers to agreement on operational
issues, just as it may inspire thoughtful deliberation for the
138. See Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
239, 261-64 (2003).
139. Cf. Bell, supra note 46, at 376-77 (attributing importance to the titles given to
prenegotiation agreements in peacemaking so as to avoid the appearance of "law"). On the
distinct questions of the role of "naming" injuries and "claiming" redress in the development
of law, see William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'YREv. 631 (1980).
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common good. And in a number of constitution-making processes,
disputes over the very name of the document have come into play.
Consider once again Germany in the aftermath of World War II.
The German state was divided into four sectors, each under the
military control of one of the Allies: the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Disagreements over
Russian claims of reparations, how generously to rebuild the
German economy, the status of certain German territories con-
tested by France, and whether to create a strong centralized
government for Germany (as the Soviet Union favored), a more
decentralized federal government (as the United States and United
Kingdom favored), or a looser confederation (as France favored)
divided their views.14 ° Over time, the United States, United
Kingdom, and France determined that a national constitution
should be prepared for their sectors; the Soviet Union refused to
participate in this process for its sector. The three western Allies
initially proposed that a constituent assembly, or a constitutional
convention, be called by the linder governments, to draft a
constitution then to be ratified by popular referendum. However,
according to Professor Golay, "[t]he leaders of both the major
Western German political parties, the Christian Democrats and the
Social Democrats, were reported to be unwilling to identify
themselves with any step which would set the seal on a partitioning
of Germany." ' The heads of the linder governments in the western
three sectors responded by saying that until it was possible for all
of Germany, including the Soviet sector, to govern itself, there
should be no constituent assembly or drafting of a "constitution."'42
Instead, they proposed the election of a "parliamentary council" by
the linder legislatures to draft a so-called "basic law" for the unified
governance of the three western occupation zones. '43 They also
rejected the idea of seeking popular ratification of a proposed basic
140. See GOLAY, supra note 33, at 1-10.
141. Id. at 14.
142. See id. at 15; see also Markovits, supra note 34, at 1308-09 (describing "fervent
disagreements" between Allied Forces and German representatives over the "semantics" of
using the word "constitution").
143. See id.
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law "as conferring an importance on it which should be reserved
only for the constitution ultimately to be adopted. 144
Notice how important the sovereignty-establishing and identity-
constituting functions of a constitution are in this story: the
political leaders of the lander governments were willing to draft
a "basic" document providing a framework of governance and
protection of human rights, but not one that would proclaim the
territorial sovereignty of any territory less than all of historic
Germany. As negotiations with the occupying powers proceeded,
German political leaders conceded that the instrument would be a
"constitutional basic law," but they insisted on the name of "Basic
Law," and included a clause, Article 146, implying that the Basic
Law was provisional by stating that 'this Basic Law will lose its
validity on the effective date of a constitution that has been chosen
by the German people in a free decision.' 145 The symbolic quality of
this Article-its lack of specificity an acknowledgment of the
practical political realities of the day-may be contrasted with the
very detailed provisions in more recent interim constitutions, not
only for provisionality but also for the processes by which the
instrument would be superseded.1 46 And the German Basic Law
also included another clause, the former Article 23, stating that the
other parts of Germany would be covered by the Basic Law upon
their accession.47 Thus, the Basic Law was ambivalent on its own
provisionality. 1
48
144. Id. As further described in Golay's book, the Allies responded quite negatively to the
Germans' efforts to avoid creating a constitution as such; there were further interchanges,
in which the German political leaders indicated that although the name would be "basic law,"
it would function as "a basic constitutional law." Id. at 16. The heads of the lInder raised a
"further objection that a popular referendum under the conditions then prevailing in Western
Germany would offer the Communists the opportunity they had been seeking," and also
raised the risk of rejection of a proposed basic law. Id. at 17. The cabined faith in the
democratic process that led the United States to propose an unelected constitution-drafting
body in Iraq was thus present in earlier moments of occupation-directed constitution-making.
145. QUINT, supra note 126, at 49 (translating Article 146 as it existed before unification).
146. See, e.g., S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 ch. 5.
147. See QUINT, supra note 126, at 47-55 (describing three possible approaches to
unification: loose confederation, reliance on Article 146, or reliance on Article 23, and
explaining why the Article 23 approach was relied on); Mathias Reimann, Takeover: German
Reunification Under a Magnifying Glass, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1988, 1995-96 (1998) (reviewing
QUINT).
148. Notwithstanding Article 146, after unification the Basic Law continued in force in all
of Germany. See QUINT, supra note 126, at 52-55; Reimann, supra note 147, 1995-98.
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Germany was by no means the only post-conflict constitution of
the modern era in which the very name of the document assumed
contentious proportions. According to one recent study, disputes
over constitution-making in Kosovo--closely tied to disputes over
the nature of its identity as part of a broader Serbia and over
the status of the Albanian Kosovars-were reflected in disputes
over the name.149 Thus, the authors report: "Kosovar Albanians
wanted to call it a constitution; the SRSG [Special Representative
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations] and other inter-
nationals saw that as implying a judgment on Kosovo's final
status.""15 The compromise worked out was to call the document the
"Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo."' 51
Northern Ireland, as well, illustrates the importance of naming
the purportedly constitutional document. Brendan O'Leary suggests
that "[n]ames matter in ethno-national conflicts," ' 2 but as we have
seen in the case of post-war Germany, names of foundational legal
instruments may matter even in the absence of such ongoing
conflicts. O'Leary describes the many names used to refer to the
agreements concerning Northern Ireland. It was published as "The
Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations"
and distributed to voters in Northern Ireland in 1998 prior to a
referendum on it. i"3 The U.K. government referred to it as "the
Belfast Agreement" in its legislation giving it effect in the Northern
Ireland Act 1998. 4 However, "republican dissident critics call it the
'Stormont Agreement,' advertizing their continuing rejection of
the partition of Ireland executed by the Westminster Parliament
in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, and their dislike of the
final negotiating venue that once housed the hated Northern
149. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 69, at 115.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Brendan O'Leary, The Belfast Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement:
Consociation, Confederal Institutions, a Federacy, and a Peace Process, in THEARCHITECTURE
OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 293, 294.
153. Id. at 294.
154. Id.; compare Northern Ireland Act 1988, ch. 47 pmbl. (Eng.) (referring to "the
agreement reached at multi-party talks on Northern Ireland"), with id. § 3 (referring to "the
Belfast Agreement").
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Ireland Parliament."'55 Others refer to it as the "April 10 1998
Agreement," and it is most popularly referred to as the "Good
Friday Agreement,"'156 a term apparently acceptable to both
Catholics and Protestants. Yet, O'Leary suggests, notwithstanding
disagreement "over whether they were making a transitional,
durable, or permanent settlement," "the Belfast Agreement's
makers knew they were effectively engaged in constitutional
crafting." '157
Names are contentious not only in immediate post-conflict
settings. Recent debate over the proposed constitution for Europe
illustrates the importance of the normative connotations of this
word. Its implicit normativity, associated with the identity-defining
claims it makes about the purported singularity of the entity, posed
a substantial political problem for efforts to obtain ratification. New
efforts at modifying the treaty instruments may retain much of the
substance of the agreements worked out but abandon the attempt
to obtain agreement that the instrument is a "constitution. '5 8
The final example I will note here is from Iraq. The Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), established by the U.S.-led occupying
forces in the spring of 2003, "initially envisioned that a representa-
tive assembly of Iraqis from around the country would write a new
constitution, which would subsequently be ratified in a national
referendum" prior to the transfer of powers to an elected Iraqi
government."6 9 However, just before the CPA formed an Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC), an influential religious leader, Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a "fatwa," or religious edict, to the
effect that "any constitution not drafted by a democratically elected
body would be 'unacceptable. '"" '0 He objected to the Coalition forces'
plan to appoint members of a body to draft a constitution, as there
was no assurance that such an assembly would 'serveo the best
155. O'Leary, supra note 152, at 294.
156. Id.; see also MITCHELL, supra note 70, at Preface (referring to "Good Friday
Agreement"); Campbell & Aoliin, supra note 58, at 871 n.1.
157. O'Leary, supra note 152, at 293.
158. See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky & Stephen Castle, Germans and Poles at Odds over EU
Constitution, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 14, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/
14/asialunion.php/php ("Britain is the other main opponent, and it won limited concessions,
including a discussion on dropping the name 'constitution'.....
159. Feldman & Martinez, supra note 58, at 891.
160. Id. at 891-92 (quoting al-Sistani).
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interests of the Iraqi people or express their national identity whose
backbone is sound Islamic religion and noble social values."' 161 The
concern over outside imposition and the desire for an Iraqi constitu-
tion to reflect the values, including religious values, of a majority of
Iraqi citizens is palpable. Although the CPA initially tried to work
around this fatwa to create a constitution-making process without
direct elections, eventually the CPA decided it needed to proceed in
accordance with al-Sistani's edict. 16 2 The new proposal called for the
IGC to draft an interim governance document that, in order "to
avoid breaching Sistani's fatwa," was to be called the "Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL)," which included the procedures to be
followed for the drafting of a final constitution by a popularly
elected assembly.163 Thus, the interim instrument (the TAL)
avoided any use of the "c" word in order to achieve apparent
compliance with the fatwa.
Other reasons have been suggested for why the name "constitu-
tion" was avoided in the TAL and for why some Iraqis may have
wanted to move towards a permanent constitution quickly. Some
scholars suggest that because Saddam Hussein relied on interim
constitutions, dissidents who played a prominent role in the
occupation period desired to quickly move towards a final "constitu-
tion." 64 As one of its drafters explained, the negative history of
constitutionalism in Iraq, associated with these interim or provi-
sional constitutions which for much of Iraq's history allowed
governance by the "caprice of a single man," also helps explain
the decision of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) not to call the
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
161. Id. at 891 n.28 (quoting al-Sistani).
162. See id. at 893-94.
163. Id. at 895.
164. See al-Istrabadi, supra note 87, at 270; see also Brown, supra note 57, at 928-29
(discussing the Interim Constitution of 1970 and the Interim Constitution of 1958, and
describing most constitutional instruments during the period of Hussein's rule as "interim
constitutions"). Brown explains that after 1958 there was a new constitution, followed by a
military coup which suspended the constitution and established authority in the
Revolutionary Command Council. See id. at 928. Thereafter, "[a]n interim constitution was
hastily issued that confirmed the Council's monopoly over authority.... The constitutional
order of Iraq grew more complex, but it did not change in essence between that time and the
abolition of the RCC by Paul Bremer in 2003." Id. Hussein's "interim constitution" may be
an example of a constitution functioning to obstruct constitutionalism. See supra note 13.
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Period (TAL) an interim or provisional constitution. Too many
provisional constitutions had been promulgated in recent
memory and "provisional" constitutions had a tendency to
become permanent in Iraq. 6'
Moreover, the drafter further explained, since under the CPA no
instrument became final unless signed by the U.S. Administrator,
"[n]o Iraqi wanted the American Civil Administrator to sign a
document called an Iraqi constitution. 166
Thus, the term "constitution" clearly goes beyond implying a
mere legal instrument, even a basic and foundational one. It is a
legal instrument associated with sovereignty, so where the nature
or territory of a state is contested its usage will have unwanted
connotations for some participants. It is also a legal instrument
associated with group identity, and thus naming it may embody
whole histories of conflict or claims of injustice.
CONCLUSION
Transitional (and transnational) agreements of many different
names and intended durations are emerging as important
proto-constitutional instruments. Constitutional lawyers, aware of
the freight carried by constitution-making, must not simply
assume that the goal is to have a constitution, when the goal is
actually to promote the capacities of people to live together under
a government that can operate peacefully, effectively, and justly.
Constitutional lawyers must carry a broader array of tools, even
while acknowledging that there is no clear and simple metric for
choosing among them. 167 Figuring out the better choices is a highly
context-specific activity, and context includes whether there are
appropriate levels of basic order, security, and meeting of humani-
tarian needs. 6 '
165. al-Istrabadi, supra note 87, at 270 (citation omitted).
166. Id.
167. Cf. Arato, supra note 26, at 22-23 (arguing that a constitution-making process with
enhanced democratic legitimacy "cannot be achieved by the imposition of concrete models,"
and urging a focus "on a plurality of principles that can be publicly used to legitimate a given
process of constitution-making," including legal continuity, a "plurality of democratic
channels, consensus, (partial) empirical translations of a veil of ignorance ... and reflexivity").
168. See STROMSETH ETAL., supra note 69, at 11-13.
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The constitutionalist's tool kit's broader repertoire now includes
transitional and interim agreements, perhaps involving other
countries or international organs, or other guarantors, and varied
forms of constitution-making procedure. Constitution-making can
no longer be conceived of as necessarily an exclusively national
project, nor as necessarily a project involving entrenchment of a
"final" constitution, but rather, as a process by which the habits of
power sharing, political compromise and respect for individual
rights are encouraged, often with the active participation of
non-national members of a concerned regional or international
community.169 Indeed, where constitutions are deployed for
peacekeeping or transformative purposes, it may be the process of
constitution-making itself, rather than the constitutional settle-
ment, that is the alternative to war-at least in some places, for
some times.
169. See also Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, From Origin to Delta: Changing
Landscape of Modern Constitutionalism (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 1815, Oct. 6,
2006), available at http://law.bepress.con/expresso/eps/1815 (discussing transitional and
transnational constitutionalism); cf. Bell, supra note 46 (treating the use of constitutions
with hybrid elements of international participation in post-conflict settings as part of a new
"lex pacificatoria').
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